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ABSTRACT 
 
PHILLIP H. KIM: Organizing Activities and Founding Processes of New Ventures 
(Under the direction of Howard Aldrich) 
 
 In this dissertation, I examine three aspects of organizational emergence: composition 
of founders’ support networks, acquisition of external organizational knowledge, and a multi-
dimensional approach to identifying emergent organizations. I draw on organizational, social 
capital, human capital, and social exchange theories to develop my hypotheses. Based on a 
random sample of nascent entrepreneurs in the United States, I found that founders rely 
heavily on their strong ties to solicit support; use their specific human capital to guide their 
acquisition of external knowledge; and follow unique founding processes that differ across 
industrial groups.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A significant proportion of working adults in the United States are likely to start new 
business during their working careers. Every year, approximately four to six percent of the 
labor force engages in activities to start new businesses (Reynolds and White 1997). Over 
their lifetimes, nearly 40 percent of the working population have some type of 
entrepreneurial experience (Aldrich and Ruef 2006). Forty-six percent of adults come from 
families where the heads of households started their own businesses and 58 percent of adults 
are interested in starting their own business some day (Steinmetz and Wright 1989). In spite 
of their aspirations to start successful businesses, most entrepreneurs encounter difficulties in 
their founding attempts.  
In his seminal essay, Stinchcombe (1965) outlined two conditions associated with the 
failure of new organizations. He argued that new firms face liabilities of newness due to 
poorly established inter-organizational networks and difficulties in developing their 
organizational infrastructure. New firms are faced with challenges of expanding their 
networks beyond a close circle of kinship ties. To establish their organizational infrastructure, 
new firms are limited to their founders’ personal knowledge or must find ways to acquire the 
necessary expertise. As a result of these conditions, founders in new firms encounter a higher 
rate of failure than more established firms.  
Stinchcombe (1965) built his argument based on the assumption that new firms have 
been created and already exist. In my dissertation, I examine whether Stinchcombe’s (1965) 
 2 
argument also applies to the emergence of new firms. I define emergence as the period 
during which founders take active steps to transform their business concepts into viable new 
organizations. I explore how the conditions for the liabilities of newness affect founders as 
they organize their new businesses.  Specifically, I investigate whether the two liabilities that 
Stinchcombe (1965) outlined – poorly developed networks and lack of organizational 
knowledge – apply to founders in the following two research questions: 
1. How do founders form their support networks from which to solicit assistance, advice, 
and other forms of backing during the start-up process? 
2. How do founders acquire organizational knowledge to supplement what they already 
know through their prior training and experiences? 
Organizations scholars who rely on Stinchcombe’s theoretical foundations have 
usually adopted his assumption of new firm existence in their empirical work (e.g., Carroll 
and Hannan 2000). Scholars in this tradition consider the creation of new firms as discrete 
events and focus on survival rates throughout the entire lifecycle of populations. Rather than 
viewing firm foundings as discrete events, I propose treating firm creation as a process of 
emergence. From this perspective, I focus on a multi-dimensional approach to identify 
emerging organizations.  As a third research question, I explore how founders’ organizing 
milestones reflect properties in emerging organizations. 
Researchers who study new firm creation as an emergent process face three major 
empirical challenges. First, to minimize the impact of survivor bias, researchers will need to 
employ a sampling strategy that identifies founders and their emerging firms early in their 
formative process. By employing this strategy, researchers can track founders who establish 
successful firms along with those that fail. Second, to assess how founders’ characteristics 
 3 
influence their ability to start new ventures, researchers should collect adequate background 
measures of founders once they and their ventures have been identified. Third, to analyze 
firm creation as an emergent process, researchers will require information on the new 
ventures and their founders over time. A longitudinal research design enables researchers to 
determine whether critical events in the emergence process influences new firm 
establishment. Researchers can also assess how changes in founders’ characteristics and their 
environment play a role in different stages of the start-up process. To address these three 
empirical challenges, researchers must employ a longitudinal research design that captures 
both individual and firm-level characteristics of founders and their emerging firms.  
[INSERT TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE] 
In previous research, scholars have relied primarily on individual-level data sources 
to examine how individuals transition into entrepreneurship. In Table 1.1, I review four types 
of individual-level data sources in the United States to highlight their strengths and 
weaknesses. In the first category, researchers have analyzed panel data such as the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market 
Experience, and Panel Study of Income Dynamics (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Fairlie 
1999). Taking advantage of their longitudinal design, these researchers have tracked 
individuals over significant portions of their careers to understand what factors promote their 
transitions into entrepreneurship. However, these samples are limited to cohort-related 
restrictions in gender, age, and race of the respondents. For example, Evans and Leighton’s 
(1989) study using National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men was restricted to a cohort of 
white men between the ages of 14 and 24 in 1966.  
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Researchers have also relied on cross-sectional datasets. For example, researchers 
have used Internal Revenue Service tax records and U.S. Census Current Population Surveys 
to explore the impact of inheritances and earnings potential on transitions to entrepreneurship 
(Devine 1994; Fairlie and Meyer 1996; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994). However, 
researchers using these government-sponsored databases are limited by the lack of 
demographic information on entrepreneurs and encounter high non-response rates in these 
data sources (Devine 1995). Other researchers have used the General Social Survey (GSS), 
which contains considerable demographics and other background information (Butler and 
Herring 1991; Hout and Rosen 2000).  
Scholars have also relied on individual-level information within data sources based 
on firm-level sampling strategies. For example, Bates (1997) used small business datasets, 
such as the Characteristics of Business Owners (sponsored by the United States Census) to 
explore the impact of founders’ financial and human capital on their transitions to 
entrepreneurship. These large datasets provide researchers information across multiple 
industries. However, due to their sampling design, analyses performed with these data are 
biased towards existing businesses. Without information on failed business, these datasets are 
more appropriate for understanding the nature of established business rather than analyzing 
how firms emerge.  
Although the studies in Table 1.1 provide some insights into how founders’ 
backgrounds affect their entry into entrepreneurship, researchers using individual-level data 
are limited in their ability to explore the processes associated with the emergence of new 
businesses. With individual-level data, firm establishment is often treated as a single, 
dichotomous outcome. For example, by using annual employment status information, 
 5 
researchers can identify spells of entrepreneurship. During these spells, researchers assume 
that founders have established new firms when they report self-employment (and have 
abandoned their businesses when not self-employed). By assuming entrepreneurial entry as a 
dichotomous outcome, researchers cannot investigate the steps founders undertook during the 
process of starting the new business. 
In my dissertation, I analyze the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), a 
dataset designed to address the challenges associated with examining founders and the 
emergence of their new ventures. The PSED was designed to identify individuals from a 
random sample of adults in the United States who reported that they were in the early stages 
of starting new businesses. In order to select these individuals, referred to as nascent 
entrepreneurs, the PSED used a multi-stage sampling approach to create a sample of 830 
nascent entrepreneurs to represent the four to six percent of the US adult population that start 
new businesses annually (Reynolds and White 1997).  The PSED contains information on 
both founders and the businesses they started. Based on a longitudinal survey design, these 
data were collected in four waves between 1998 and 2003. Additional methodological details 
about the survey design are provided in Gartner et al. (2004b). 
The PSED provides opportunities to overcome many of the limitations that I have 
highlighted in Table 1.1. First, by specifically identifying nascent entrepreneurs and tracking 
their progress over time, the PSED minimizes survivor biases associated with datasets that 
are restricted to businesses that are more advanced in their development. To ensure this 
distinction, the PSED relies on a multi-part definition to qualify individuals as nascent 
entrepreneurs. Second, by interviewing nascent entrepreneurs, the PSED contains 
comprehensive information on founders’ backgrounds and the nature of the businesses they 
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started. The PSED also over-sampled women and minorities to enhance the quality of the 
data for these respective groups. 
In addition to collecting respondents’ background information, the PSED also asks 
respondents to provide information on other collaborators who have assisted in the 
development of their new businesses. This unique feature of the PSED allows researchers to 
explore how and to what extent founders work cooperatively with others in building new 
organizations. The PSED contains information on two categories of collaborators: owners 
(team members who have equity in the planned venture) and helpers (individuals who 
provide advice, services, or other forms of support). In addition to their background 
information, the PSED asks respondents to describe the nature of their relationships with 
these collaborators. Given its longitudinal design, the PSED captures changes in ownership 
and helpers over the successive waves of data collection. These ego-network data enable 
researchers to bridge together individual-level explanations of entrepreneurial entry and firm 
creation within the context of their local social networks.  
In developing my arguments of founders’ social networks, I assume founders face 
three constraints in developing their social networks (Kim and Aldrich 2005). First, founders 
tend to associate with others that share similar characteristics. Due to their preference 
towards homophily, founders will likely lack significant diversity in their networks (Blau 
1977). Second, founders are guided by social boundaries that channel their relationships. Due 
to their family relations, involvement in religious and ethnic communities, and participation 
in other organized aspects of their social lives, founders will be less likely to pursue 
relationships that cuts across these boundaries (McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic 1992). 
Third, as humans with finite capacities, founders will settle for less than optimal choices. 
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Faced with bounded rationality, founders may aspire to, but will unlikely build and maintain 
support networks, such as one designed by a network analyst, that maximizes their full 
potential (March and Simon 1958). Based on these three assumptions, I develop my 
argument that contrasts a more strategically-oriented perspective in which founders take 
steps to build and benefit from favorable network configurations. I use founders’ social 
network information from the PSED in two ways. First, I utilize the relationship information 
between founders and their helpers to examine how founders form their support networks. 
Second, I investigate the types of contributions made by the collaborators to assess how 
founders secure entrepreneurial knowledge.  
Another important feature of the PSED design was to ask respondents to describe 
their business ventures in significant detail. Respondents reported progress on their start-ups 
by providing information on various start-up activities, such as completing a business plan, 
generating revenues, and developing the product/service. Respondents also provided timing 
information if these start-up activities were completed. I relied on this section of the PSED to 
examine what types of processes new firms followed as they emerged into established 
organizational entities. By having both individual and firm-level data in the PSED, I was able 
to explore how founders’ characteristics, both individually and their collaborators, impacted 
the progress they made with their new ventures.  
The dissertation is organized into three substantive chapters. Each of these chapters 
follows a stand alone, article-style format. Within each chapter, I propose a specific set of 
hypotheses, describe methodologies, and discuss results. In Chapter 2 (Too Close for 
Comfort), I explore the characteristics of founders’ support networks. Using social capital 
and social exchange theories, I explain why founders are more likely to work closely with 
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their strong ties and only selectively with weak and indirect ties. In Chapter 3 (Rounding out 
the Team), I investigate how founders acquire external organizational knowledge. I use 
human capital theory to argue that founders’ human capital guides their acquisition of 
general and specific knowledge. I also draw on social capital theory to describe how founders 
acquire knowledge through relationships developed in their previous training experiences. In 
Chapter 4 (Open for Business), I propose a multi-dimensional, process-based approach to 
identifying emerging organizations. I treat organizational emergence as a latent variable with 
three dimensions: goal orientation, boundedness, and inter-organizational exchange. I 
conclude with a final chapter that summarizes my primary findings, discusses limitations of 
the study, and outline extensions for future research. 
CHAPTER 2: TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT - STRONG TIES IN SUPPORT 
NETWORKS OF NEW VENTURES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Founders must overcome considerable obstacles to ensure their new organizations’ 
survival. Faced with liabilities of newness, founders need to deal with their nascent firms’ 
resource constraints, lack of legitimacy, and competitive threats (Aldrich and Ruef 2006; 
Carroll and Hannan 2000; Stinchcombe 1965). To overcome these hurdles, founders can 
solicit support during early stages of new ventures from their networks of relationships 
(Reynolds and White 1997). Without resources to hire expert consultants or talented 
employees, founders may turn to their support networks to find cost-effective solutions to 
address their short-term needs, such as external advisors who can provide technical advice, 
make introductions to key individuals, and facilitate access to financial and physical 
resources (Hite and Hesterly 2001). In this chapter, I explore how and under what conditions 
founders form their support networks and whether their support sustains their start-up efforts. 
Based on social capital theory, I argue that founders can develop their support 
networks in two ways. They can call upon their close ties to form dense networks of 
overlapping relationships. In these networks, social closure allows efficient transmission of 
information among actors and establishes mechanisms to promote trust and enforcement of 
social norms (Coleman 1988). Alternatively, founders may act strategically to identify 
individuals with whom few relationships would overlap in their support networks. With more 
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distant ties, these individuals enable founders to develop networks with greater range (Burt 
1992). Founders can access new information and resources through these network brokers, 
who act as bridges to other dense local networks (Granovetter 1973).  
Given the potential benefits of both approaches, founders might prefer to build a 
portfolio of relationships that combines both close and distant ties (Baker 1990; Reagans and 
Zuckerman 2001). However, despite these intentions, founder will likely be constrained by 
the types of relationships in which they are embedded. In explaining his liability of newness 
argument, Stinchcombe (1965) reasoned that founders in new organizations are vulnerable to 
the inefficiencies of relying on close friends and family and the risks of depending on 
untested relationships with strangers. If founders rely on their direct ties, they enjoy 
reciprocity and other benefits of network closure. But due to overlapping relationships, a 
direct tie strategy limits the development of relationships with greater network reach 
(Renzulli, Aldrich, and Moody 2000). If strangers are pursued and successfully recruited, 
founders still need to weigh their contributions with the risks of opportunism and other 
uncertainties from parties with whom no prior relationships exist (Aldrich 2006; Williamson 
1981).  
Confronted with these limitations, do founders favor one approach over another to 
build their support networks? Drawing on social exchange theory, I argue that founders will 
prefer to work more closely with their established ties (Blau 1964; Ekeh 1974; Lévi-Strauss 
1969). With mutual trust and understanding in place, founders have the ability to solicit 
various types of support from their direct ties without being compelled to reciprocate 
immediately. In contrast, founders who recruit more distant ties do not have established 
working relationships in place. The two parties will need to negotiate prior to their 
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collaboration in order to define the context of their relationship. Due to upfront investment 
costs, founders may be more cautious when pursuing these new relationships. 
In the following sections, I describe how founders benefit from their support 
networks. Based on social capital and social exchange theories, I then develop a set of 
testable hypotheses for how founders develop their support networks. I test these hypotheses 
using the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), a nationally representative 
random sample of nascent entrepreneurs who are actively working to start new businesses. I 
find evidence that confirms founders’ preference for working with established ties in their 
support networks. However, founders who rely heavily on direct ties are more likely to 
abandon their start-up efforts.  
THE ROLE OF SUPPORT NETWORKS 
Founders form external support networks for several reasons. Typically operating 
with limited resources, they look to their external support network, especially in smaller 
ventures, to supplement their own expertise. Founders may draw on their support networks in 
the following three ways. 
First, they may seek business or technical advice from experts to provide 
organizational knowledge related to operations and strategic planning in their nascent firms 
(Aldrich and Ruef 2006). By relying on their advisors’ expertise, founders can efficiently 
resolve issues that may require a significant investment of their own time and resources. 
Founders with little or no previous start-up experience may need assistance with day-to-day 
operations, such as keeping accurate financial records, meeting legal obligations, or fulfilling 
customer needs. Experienced founders may seek more specific expertise they personally lack, 
such as guidance on entering new product markets. Founders can utilize their external 
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advisors to scan their business environment for competitive action and availability of 
underexploited resources (Useem 1984). In this function, advisors positioned in non-
redundant areas of a network can receive and transmit this type of information to founders 
(Burt 1992). Advisors with high network prestige will be more likely to receive information 
from individuals with whom they maintain direct and indirect ties. For example, advisors 
active in a local Chamber of Commerce can recommend how proposed local ordinances will 
affect planned new ventures within its jurisdiction.  
Second, founders’ support networks can provide important introductions to potential 
investors, customers, or other stakeholders to new organizations. Through these introductions, 
founders may meet experts, future employees, or other entrepreneurs to discuss business 
matter informally (Davis, Renzulli, and Aldrich 2006). In particular, prominent individuals in 
founders’ support networks can heighten awareness of and lend credibility to new ventures 
through well-placed endorsements that enable new firms to overcome any doubts about their 
legitimacy (Podolny 2001; Stinchcombe 1965). Well-connected supporters who occupy 
central network positions provide greater impact to their endorsements (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994). Upon endorsement, potential exchange partners, such as suppliers, customers, 
and financiers may increase their willingness to work with founders and their new ventures 
(Shane and Cable 2002).  
Finally, founders can receive mentoring and emotional support. Experienced mentors 
can coach entrepreneurs to avoid certain mistakes, especially those with little start-up 
experience. In a 2005 nationally representative survey sponsored by the OPEN Small 
Business Network of 627 business owners/managers of fewer than 100 employees, 
approximately one-half of the owners reported using mentors for general business decisions 
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or ideas to grow their businesses (AMEX 2005). In a study of female entrepreneurs, Moore 
and Buttner (1997) reported that respondents cited emotional support as being the most 
important role of their professional networks.  
FORMING SUPPORT NETWORKS 
 In the following sections, I explain how founders form their support networks. I 
introduce three hypotheses regarding support networks: their size, the role of strong and 
weak ties, and whether their configurations sustain start-up efforts. 
Support Network Size 
As founding teams increase in size, the number of possible support relationships 
could increase as a function of the number of core team members. This assumption is based 
on the role of weak ties – the enlarged pool of potential supporters increases bridging 
opportunities for founders beyond their local network of strong ties (Granovetter 1973). 
However, I offer three reasons why support networks may not grow in proportion to 
founding team size. First, founding teams tend to form around homophilous strong ties (Ruef, 
Aldrich, and Carter 2003). Limitations on time, energy, and geographic propinquity 
complicate developing and sustaining numerous strong tie relationships (Blau 1977). In these 
situations, founders’ strong tie relationships are more likely to overlap extensively and share 
similar backgrounds and experiences. As a result, the ability to marshal assistance from a 
wider range of potential advisors decreases (Burt 1992; Lin 2001).  
Second, founders may attempt to recruit other team members with varied backgrounds 
to complement their existing skills. If they can successfully attract and work together with 
qualified individuals, founders can delay calling on their support networks during the early 
stages of development. For example, founders who lack experience in managing growth in 
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new ventures may recruit seasoned managers in anticipation of this phase of venture 
development (Boeker and Karichalil 2002). During the dot.com era of the 1990s, ambitious 
college and graduate students who experienced initial success with their fledgling internet 
companies realized their need for experienced executives to head day to day operations and 
lead additional fundraising activities.  
Third, relationships among founders and between founders and their support networks 
differ based on the level of investment in their new ventures. By devoting significant time, 
energy, and financial resources, owners aim to develop asset specificity within their start-up 
team by assembling complementary and relevant skills and experiences (Williamson 1981). 
Founders expect their teammates to resolve business matters by looking internally for 
additional assistance. Compared to external supporters, founders have more interest in their 
new ventures’ success, given their greater level of investment (Williamson 1981). For these 
reasons, I expect: 
Hypothesis 1: As founding teams increase in size and diversity, support network size 
will decrease.  
The Role of Strong Ties 
To fully reap the benefits of their support networks, founders may aspire to have a 
balanced set of seasoned mentors, prominent advisors, and other specialists in their support 
networks. Guided by their experience, some founders may anticipate their needs and attempt 
to recruit qualified people into their networks. However, this strategy requires founders to 
have the foresight into how their start-up efforts will evolve (Aldrich and Ruef 2006). 
Without clairvoyance, most founders are unlikely to predict a priori how and when they will 
turn to their support networks. Thus, when needs arise, founders will first call on individuals 
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with whom they have strong ties within their current network of relationships, rather than 
seek out unknown experts prior to launching their ventures (Larson 1992; Podolny 2001; Xu 
and Ruef 2007). 
Founders are likely to rely more heavily on their strong ties due to established norms 
between the two actors. In these relationships, both actors have invested considerable time 
and energy into developing a deep mutual understanding for one another (Granovetter 1973). 
These frequent and substantive interactions enable both actors to develop an awareness of 
each other’s abilities and preferences. Built on trust, strong ties enjoy a higher level of 
reciprocity than weak ties. For example, Actor A may respond to a call for assistance from 
Actor B, without consideration of how or when Actor B will compensate for Actor A’s 
assistance. Social exchange theorists refer to these transactions as reciprocated exchanges 
(Blau 1964). Given their level of mutual understanding, strong tie relationships operate with 
norms of reciprocity that allow parties to grant assistance without consideration of benefits to 
be received (Molm 2003). For these reasons, individuals look to a core set of strong ties to 
request material and social support (Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs 2000; Kadushin 2002; 
Renzulli and Aldrich 2005).  
For founders, the benefits from working with their strong ties are several. Within their 
local network of strong ties, founders may avoid significant upfront direct costs for assistance 
and draw on a “line of credit” from their strong tie support networks as a form of 
entrepreneurial bricolage (Baker and Nelson 2005). Due to frequent contact, founders are 
likely to have ongoing conversations with strong ties about their new ventures. As a result, 
founders can rely on earlier interactions to avoid repeating details or providing extensive 
explanations and ease the transfer of complex information (Hansen 1999). Founders may feel 
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more at ease picking up the phone and asking advice of close confidents who are more 
patient in entertaining questions and solicitations for assistance and respond in a timely 
manner (Uzzi 1996).  
Working with direct ties may create a more suitable environment for mentoring or 
emotional support. Having opportunities to discuss challenges and receive encouragement 
from confidants can boost morale and energize founders in their work. Founders may have 
provided similar assistance in the past to their strong ties and as a result, may be inclined to 
provide an opportunity for them to reciprocate (Larson 1992).  
Social exchange theorists place dyadic reciprocal exchange transactions within a 
broader category of generalized exchanges (Blau 1964; Ekeh 1974; Lévi-Strauss 1969). 
Generalized (or indirect) exchanges are not confined to dyadic relationships and involve 
more than two actors. For example, Actor A receives support from Actor B, but does not 
expect to reciprocate directly. Assisting a disabled motorist and reviewing professional 
journal articles are examples of generalized exchanges, where any compensation from these 
actions come indirectly through continued participation in the exchange system (Yamagishi 
and Cook 1993). By participating in a generalized exchange system, founders can receive 
support from other members without immediate or direct reciprocation.  
In particular, family-based exchange systems provide founders a setting in which 
reciprocal exchange relationships can flourish. For example, older family members often 
lend advice to their younger relatives without any expectations of receiving direct 
compensation from them. Founders may have a previous history of assisting other family 
members in generous ways. Within the context of family relations, founders are likely to 
expect and receive trustworthy advice (Kadushin 2002; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 
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2001). Founders can receive frequent and informal support from other family members 
(Hurlbert et al. 2000). Family members in particular serve as an important source of resource 
mobilization for entrepreneurs, especially from those with relevant previous experiences 
(Aldrich and Cliff 2003). For these reasons, I expect: 
Hypothesis 2: Founders are more likely to solicit support from family members than 
other types of direct ties. 
Although there are benefits to working with strong ties, founders face several 
limitations if they exclusively follow this approach. First, founders will likely receive 
redundant information and resources (Carley 1991). For example, as interactions continue 
and intensify between founders and their support network, any unique knowledge known by 
supporters will flow between actors and be shared by both parties. Founders will share 
similar network features as they develop relationships with individuals introduced to them by 
their strong ties (Granovetter 1973). Over time, both founder and individuals in the support 
networks will exhibit redundant features, reducing the support networks’ ability to contribute 
new and unique information that founders cannot access by themselves.  
Second, the principle of homophily suggests that founders may limit themselves to 
working with individuals with similar backgrounds (Blau 1977). Due to their common 
locations in socio-demographic space, founders who work primarily with strong ties are less 
likely to acquire new knowledge from individuals with varied backgrounds. Third, networks 
of strong ties between alters, in addition to those between ego and alters, lead to a decline in 
network efficiency (Burt 1992). Founders with inefficient support networks lack network 
range because individuals know each other and may not be in position to access more distant 
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resources and information. For example, family based founding teams who work closely with 
other family members are more likely to have inefficient networks.  
Therefore, founders may encounter situations when their strong ties are not equipped 
to provide the support they need. Under these circumstances, founders will turn to their weak 
and indirect ties during early stages of their start-up efforts. By accessing their weak and 
indirect ties, founders may uncover new information and resources (Granovetter 1973). 
However, ease of access to support depends on two factors: the configuration of founders’ 
networks and willingness to invest in developing new relationships.  
Most individuals are embedded in dense, local networks (Watts 2003). Because weak 
ties provide links to other local networks, founders with multiple weak ties are best 
positioned to uncover new information and resources. Under these circumstances, weak ties 
serve as bridges that allow founders to develop new relationships in other local networks 
(Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973). However, for founders who are not embedded in sparse 
networks, pursuing these new relationships can be quite taxing due to the time and energy 
investment required to sustain them. Growing networks of weak ties require founders to 
overcome inclinations to recruit individuals into their networks only from their own 
sociodemographic niche (McPherson 1983). Second, founders should have an ability to scan 
their personal networks, beyond their immediate direct ties, to identify additional, well 
positioned advisors. Individuals will fall short of identifying optimal configurations due to 
their bounded rationality (March and Simon 1958).  
Founders who pursue weak and indirect ties for support in their networks also are 
more likely to enter into negotiated exchanges. Negotiated exchanges are one form of a 
restricted exchange that occur exclusively between two parties and involve direct 
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reciprocation from one actor to another (Blau 1964; Ekeh 1974; Molm 2003). Because 
established norms that direct their relationships do not exist, founders may be required by 
other actors to agree to guidelines that oversee their support. Both actors will settle on the 
terms of their exchange through some form of bargaining process. Negotiated exchanges call 
for founders to invest more significantly into preparing and maintaining these relationships 
than with their strong ties. Based on factors such as quality and availability, founders will 
screen potential individuals from whom to solicit support. Often, these transactions will 
require founders to compensate for services and advice they receive. Given limited resources, 
founders will want to limit the number of negotiated exchange agreements. Unless creative 
methods to delay compensation are negotiated, founders will call on them sparingly until 
their start-up efforts progress in development.  
Under ideal circumstances, negotiated exchanges may evolve into reciprocal 
exchanges, as both parties develop trust and construct norms that guide their interactions 
(Blau 1964; Ruef 2003). Experimental studies have shown that reciprocal exchanges generate 
greater levels of trust and commitment than negotiated exchanges (e.g., Molm, Takahashi, 
and Peterson 2000). Founders who intend to cultivate stronger ties out of their negotiated 
exchange relationships may encounter difficulties in moving away from agreements that 
guide their interactions. In spite of these limitations, a major benefit to founders comes from 
the extra planning involved to form and maintain effective negotiated exchange relationships. 
With limited resources on hand, founders will take extra steps to ensure that any investment 
made into these transactions will result in productive exchange relationships. For example, 
when working with attorneys who charge by the minute, founders will prepare their questions 
in advance in order to make efficient use of their consultations. This extra planning can also 
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protect founders from negotiations that exploit their limited resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978; Williamson 1981).  
Serving as bridging relationships, weak tie supporters provide an additional benefit of 
linking founders to other local networks (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001; Watts 2003). For 
example, individuals who span multiple local networks can provide introductions to potential 
customers or funding sources through bridging relationships to founders. Therefore, in spite 
of the added start-up costs, founders who identify and develop successful relationships will 
access valuable support that can ultimately benefit sustaining their new ventures.  
Previous studies have shown positive benefits that result from maintaining a hybrid 
support network, anchored by a core set of strong ties and complemented by additional weak 
ties (Baker 1990; Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). Founders will likely draw heavily from 
their core set of strong ties and selectively solicit support from other relationships within 
their network. Collectively, this should have a positive effect on start-up efforts during their 
initial stages. For these reasons, I expect: 
Hypothesis 3: Founders who work primary with strong ties in the support network are 
more likely to abandon their start-up efforts.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
I analyzed data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), a 
nationally representative sample of nascent entrepreneurs in the United States actively 
starting new businesses. To form the sample, a two-stage design was used. In the first stage, 
59,575 adults, aged 18 years and older, residing within the contiguous 48 states of the United 
States, were selected between July, 1998 and January, 2000 using random digit dialing 
(RDD) methodology. These individuals completed a screening interview which contained 
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four qualifying questions. Individuals qualified as nascent entrepreneurs if they expected to 
be majority owners of new businesses they had been actively trying to start within the last 12 
months. Owners reporting firms with positive cash flow for at least three months or majority 
institutional ownership did not qualify. This initial screening interview resulted in a pool of 
1,164 eligible individuals who could be located. From this pool, individuals were randomly 
drawn and invited to participate in the full study. In this second stage, 830 individuals, which 
included women and minority over-samples, completed the full survey, for a response rate of 
71 percent.  Respondents reported information on their new ventures, team members and 
members of their external support networks. The University of Michigan’s Institute for 
Social Research oversaw the final data collection efforts. A complete description of the 
study’s background, sampling methodology, and response rates can be found in Gartner et al. 
(2004b).  
Due to various reasons, I dropped 23 cases from the final sample. Fourteen cases of 
the 23 cases were dropped due to lack of majority ownership by nascent entrepreneur(s) 
(seven cases), maturity of the new business based on three months of positive cash flow (six 
cases), or missing team data (one case) (Ruef et al. 2003). After reviewing start-up activity 
information, I dropped an additional nine cases based on four reasons: misinterpretation of 
questions (two cases), no reported start-up activity (three cases), and start-up too advanced 
based on timing of accomplished activities (four cases). In my analyses, I used an effective 
sample of 807 cases. 
The nascent entrepreneurs in the sample responded to two name generator questions. 
The first question asked for names of other individuals who would share in ownership of the 
new venture. I refer to these individuals as members of the start-up team. The second 
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question asked for names of people who have been helpful in the start-up process, but not 
members of the start-up team. I refer to this set of individuals as the external support network. 
For both name generators, respondents could provide up to five names and for each 
individual identified, a set of name interpreter questions were asked. Start-up team size was 
based on the number of owners reported with the name generator question.  
For start-up team members only, respondents reported role relations between 
ego/alter and among each alter. Respondents chose from six categories (spouse/partner; 
relative/family members; business associates/work colleagues; friends/acquaintances; 
strangers before joining the team; other type of relationship) to describe each relationship 
within the start-up team. For the support network, respondents reported role relations 
between only ego and alter from the following six categories (spouse/partner; relative/family 
members; business associates/work colleagues; friends/acquaintances; teacher/counselor; 
other type of relationship). As a result, relationships between alters can be derived only 
among family members. Fourteen new ventures reported having a non-person team member 
holding a minority ownership stake (e.g., financial institution, business). For these cases, I 
excluded the relations between other team members and non-person entities from the 
measures described below.  
I utilized individual case weights calculated by the Institute for Survey Research at 
the University of Michigan for the PSED. These weights accounted for differences in 
selection probabilities based on age, education, race, and sex (based on the Current 
Population Surveys conducted by the U.S. Census) and corrected for differences due to 
differential non-response rates (Curtin and Reynolds 2004). 
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Variables 
Start-up team variables: In addition to team size, I created the following team-related 
variables. To measure kin relationships, I coded teams with a spousal/partner pair with a 
dichotomous variable and also calculated the number of non-spousal kin ties that existed 
among all members of the start-up teams. Spousal pairs occurred in approximately one-half 
of all new ventures that started as teams, with an additional 20 percent of teams composed of 
other non-spousal family members (Ruef et al. 2003).  
To develop variables for tie strength, I used measures of sociodemographic distances. I 
relied on unification principle developed by Fararo and Skvoretz (1987), who stated that 
“The greater the number of dimensions along which associates differ, the greater is the 
chance that the tie is weak” (1199). Based on this principle, I approximated tie strength by 
identifying structural similarities of related individuals. Due to the effects of homophily, I 
assumed that similarly situated individuals are more likely to build relationships and sustain 
them over time (Burt 2000; McPherson et al. 2001).  
Given their effectiveness as indicators of tie strength, I calculated age, gender, and race 
distance measures among team members (McPherson et al. 2001). For age heterogeneity, I 
calculated the standard deviation among all team members. For gender diversity, I created 
indicator variables for all male, all female, and mixed gender teams (excluding spousal pairs). 
Single gender teams made up approximately 70 percent of the non-spousal sample. For racial 
diversity, I used a dichotomous indicator to code the eight percent of teams which were 
heterogeneous. I treated solo ventures as a special case of a start-up team and coded these 
cases in the following manner: size (one); age heterogeneity (zero); gender diversity (either 
all male or female); and racial diversity (no). 
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Support network variables: Respondents reported whether they worked with other 
people outside the start-up team “who have been particularly helpful to you in getting the 
business started.” Respondents who reported “yes” provided the number of helpful 
individuals to their new ventures. I used this information to calculate support network size. 
For the 37 percent of respondents who reported no supporters, I coded their support network 
size to zero. Respondents also provided gender, race (white, black, Hispanic, other race), age, 
and relationship information for up to five of their most helpful individuals. Because there 
was incomplete background information for 39 respondents who reported having more than 
five supporters, I created an indicator variable for their cases. To test for network closure 
effects due to kin relations, I calculated both the number of kin and non-kin supporters. The 
number of kin and non-kin supporters ranged from zero to five. I also calculated the total 
number of kin ties among all founders and their supporters. 
Respondents reported how many years they have had a relationship with the 
supporter, with an average and median length of 11.6 and 8.5 years, respectively. For 81 
cases, respondents reported knowing the supporter “all my life” for at least one supporter. I 
used the following procedure to recode these cases. If the supporter was a relative, I coded 
either the age of the respondent or supporter (which ever was smaller). If the supporter was a 
friend, I coded the age of the respondent minus seven years, assuming the childhood 
friendship started at age seven. If the supporter was a teacher or counselor, I coded the age of 
the respondent minus 15 years, assuming the relationship started at age 15. If the supporter 
was a work colleague or business associate, I coded the age of the respondent minus 21 years, 
assuming the relationship started at age 21. For each respondent, I summed together the 
number of times they discussed business matters in the last month with their supporters. I 
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took the natural logarithm of the time variable to correct for skewness (average and median 
number of discussions occurred 26 and 15 times respectively and ranged from 0 to 320 
times).  
I included five control variables. Because start-up team composition may vary based 
on the type of business, I created a four category industrial sector measure 
(primary/manufacturing; retail/wholesale; consumer/support services; professional services) 
based on 1997 NAICS coding scheme. I included two measures of previous work experience, 
proportion of start-up team members with start-up experience and average years of 
experience in the industry of the new venture, which can also contribute to the development 
of support relationships. I included organizing time to account for the length of time founders 
have been working on their ventures. Respondents reported if and when 25 start-up activities 
(e.g., purchasing raw materials, writing a business plan, etc.) occurred. I calculated 
organizing time based on the number of months between their earliest reported activity and 
time of interview. (See Appendix A for details.) I took the natural logarithm of organizing 
time to correct for skewness. Finally, I created an indicator variable to distinguish the 13 
percent of new ventures affiliated with an external sponsor such as a franchisor or multi-level 
marketing firm. I included this variable to account for founders who gained access to a wider 
network of resources through their sponsors. In Table 2.1, I present additional descriptive 
statistics for these and other variables used in my analyses.  
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE] 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
To test Hypothesis 1, I estimated the relationship between start-up team 
characteristics and size of the support network using negative binomial regression techniques 
(n=776, based on listwise deletion). I used these techniques over Poisson regression models 
because overdispersion existed. The dispersion parameter (α) was greater than zero and 
statistically significant for all models. Based on regression diagnostics, I did not observe any 
indications of collinearity (values of VIF were less than three). In addition to the overall 
number of supporters, I tested relationships for kin and non-kin supporters separately with 
network size.  
In Table 2.2, I reported results for three separate models, based on (a) total, (b) kin, 
and (c) non-kin supporters, for each of the five start-up team characteristics (size, age, family 
tie, gender, and racial diversity) provided at the first interview. Results from these models 
provide general support for negative relationships between team size and diversity with 
support network size (Hypothesis 1). In Model 1, age and racial diversity were negatively 
associated with total support network size. For each standard deviation increase in age, the 
support network size decreased by three percent (i.e., 100*(exp-.03 – 1)). Mixed race teams 
decreased support network size by almost 40 percent. However, as the number of kin ties 
increased in founding teams, the expected number of supporters increased by about 13 
percent. In Model 2, for each additional team member, the expected number of kin supporters 
dropped by 55 percent, but kin ties again had a positive influence on the expected number of 
kin supporters (by over 40 percent for each additional tie). The positive relationship between 
non-spousal kin ties and the support network size in Models 1 and 2 suggests that founders 
look to their extended relations for support during the start-up phase (Aldrich and Cliff 2003). 
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Contrary to expectations in Hypothesis 1, the expected number of kin supporters doubled for 
mixed gender teams (i.e., 100*(exp.72 – 1)). In Model 3, the expected number of non-kin 
supporters decreased by one-half for teams with spousal pairs. Relationships may overlap for 
spousal pairs and restrict the pool of potential supporters.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 focused on the relative reliance by founders on strong and weak 
ties within their support networks. I tested these hypotheses using negative binomial 
regression models, with total number of business discussions during the last month as my 
dependent variable. The dispersion parameter (α) was greater than zero and statistically 
significant for all models. I restricted this analysis to teams having at least one supporter at 
the first interview (n=487, based on listwise deletion). Eight percent of teams reported more 
than five supporters. Because I had complete information on the length or type of 
relationship for the five most important supporters, I included an indicator for teams with 
large supporter networks in the following models. Based on regression diagnostics, I did not 
observe any indications of collinearity (values of VIF were less than two).  
[INSERT TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 2.3, I reported results supporting Hypothesis 2. Founders were more likely to 
have frequent discussions about business matters with their core direct ties, as measured by 
length of relationships. For every year founders have known their supporters (Model 1), the 
expected number of discussions increased by two percent. In terms of working specifically 
with other family members, I found the expected number of discussions increased by almost 
65 percent for each additional supporter who was a family member (Model 2).  
I also found support for selective use of founders’ non-family ties. Founders were 
very unlikely to work with indirect ties. Based on descriptive analyses, only one percent of 
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founders reported working with strangers in their support network. Founders were likely to 
receive some support from other existing ties, but to a lesser extent compared to their family 
ties. The expected number of business discussions dropped from almost 65 percent for family 
supporters to 15 percent for each additional non-kin supporter (Model 2). In all three models, 
teams with spousal pairs were less likely to discuss business matters with supporters. Among 
the control variables, teams with more start-up experience and working with an external 
sponsor increased the likelihood of having frequent discussions with their supporters. Teams 
having more than five supporters also had a positive relationship, implying that founders 
engaged more regularly with their supporters in large networks (Model 3).  
 In my final analysis, I assessed whether support networks contribute to sustaining the 
founding process. I analyzed the impact of network size on the rate at which founders 
abandoned the start-up process. Respondents became at-risk for quitting their new ventures 
after the first qualified start-up activity occurred. (Refer to Appendix A for details.) The 
outcome event was whether respondents quit their start-up efforts. A total of 316 respondents 
reported quitting their new ventures. I updated support network and team covariate 
information at the following time points: start-up team formation dates, interview dates (up to 
four), and quit date (if applicable). For the control variables and kinship variables among 
team and support networks, I used their initial values and did not update them over time.  
I assumed all start-ups started as solo ventures initially. Team size was updated at the 
time of start-up team formation. For 101 cases, respondents reported start-up team formation 
as their first start-up activity. For these cases, I assigned team size reported at the first 
interview for the initial spell. For 152 cases, respondents reported forming a start-up team 
prior to the initial interview, but reported being a solo owner at the first interview. Because 
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the respondent did not provide any information on their former teammates, I assumed team 
size to be one since the beginning of their start-up activities. For teams that experienced 
ownership changes after the first interview, I assumed they occurred shortly after the last 
recorded interview, because respondents did not disclose when any changes in ownership 
occurred. For example, if the respondent reported two owners at the second interview, I 
assigned the value of two for team size between the first and second interview spell.  
[INSERT TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 2.4, I reported results for the piecewise exponential models. The underlying 
functional form followed a non-monotonic trajectory consistent with the liability of 
adolescence theory (Brüderl and Schussler 1990; Stinchcombe 1965). To estimate duration 
dependence, I used a piecewise exponential model with four time segments beginning at 0, 
12, 24, and 48 months since first start-up activity. In Model 1, founders with ventures 
between 24 and 48 months in age quit at almost three times (e5.91-4.87) the rate of younger 
ventures between 0 and 12 months of start-up. After peaking during the 24 to 48 month time 
segment, the rate of quitting decreased for ventures greater than 48 months.  
In Hypothesis 3, I predicted that founders who work closely with their strong ties are 
more likely to quit. I found support for this hypothesis. Founders who work more closely 
with family members in their support networks were more likely to abandon their start-up 
efforts. Greater kin ties on the founding team alone did not have a statistically significant 
relationship, but greater total kin ties (i.e., among team and support network) did increase the 
rate of quitting. For each additional kin tie, the expected rate of quitting increased by five 
percent. Frequency of business discussions with the support network also increased the rate 
of quitting. The association’s small magnitude may be due in part to the positive effect of 
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selective discussions with weak ties, diluting the negative effect of considerable reliance on 
family members.  
Contrary to expectations in Hypothesis 3, founders who work with their spouses were 
less likely to abandon their start-up efforts. Additionally, founders with larger support 
networks were also less likely to abandon their start-up efforts. Larger support networks 
decreased the rate of quitting by about 12 percent for each additional supporter (100*(e-0.12-
1)). In larger support networks, founders may increase their likelihood of having weak ties to 
support their founding efforts.  
 I ran two sensitivity analyses to check for model robustness. First, I examined 
whether left-truncation issues in the PSED produced biased results. Following the 
recommendations of Gartner et al. (2004b), I reran all four models for ventures 24 months or 
younger in age.  As a second test, I used a Cox model and included organizing time (ln) as a 
control variable (Singer and Willett 2002). In both situations, I found results consistent with 
the original models. Additionally, these models exhibited good fit, based on plots of the 
Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function against the cumulative Cox-Snell residuals. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, I explore how and under what conditions founders form their support 
networks and whether their support sustains their start-up efforts. I summarize my results in 
the following three ways. First, diverse founding teams, in terms of age and race are less 
likely to look to their support network for assistance. However, teams with a high density of 
family members are more likely to rely on other family members for support. Second, 
founders discuss business matters more often with supporters with whom a long-term 
relationship exists. Founders also engaged in selective discussions with their supporters 
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beyond their families. Third, although larger support networks benefit founders by reducing 
the rate of quitting, founders who work primarily with other family members are more likely 
to quit.   
I highlight several features of the PSED study design to describe the context for 
which these results should be evaluated. Addressing issues related to these design features 
can also serve as the basis for future research. First, because respondents reported 
information for each alter and relationships between alters, the PSED collected only one slice 
of the respondents’ cognitive social network (Krackhardt 1987). Respondents did not 
distinguish whether advisors nominated through the name-interpreter questions were 
recruited by other team members. Respondents can report some attributes for alters, such as 
their gender, racial, or family relations, with minimal uncertainty (White and Watkins 2000). 
However, when requesting more detailed information (such as educational and financial 
background), ego-based reports will likely result in increased non-response or measurement 
error. Collecting this type of information would require alters to be interviewed directly.  
Second, direct measures of tie strength, such as Granovetter’s (1973) four-part 
definition (amount of time, emotional intensity, mutual confiding, and reciprocity) may yield 
additional insights. Although I used sociodemographic distance measures as a proxy, direct 
measures of tie strength can capture additional differences in the relationship context 
especially among family members (Marsden and Campbell 1984). Third, for multi-person, 
non-kin based founding teams, information on the support network may be incomplete. 
Because I relied on information provided by respondents, additional supporters relied upon 
by other team members may have been omitted by the respondent. Although relying on 
respondents’ reports may underestimate the presence of weak tie supporters, I consider the 
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impact to be small. I assumed kin-based teams had overlapping networks, which minimized 
the potential number of additional supporters who were not reported. Approximately twenty 
percent of multi-person founding teams had at least one non-kin tie.  
Fourth, because small teams start new ventures, drawing any inferences from a 
reduced sample of larger teams may be premature. A study conducted on large founding 
teams could yield additional insights (e.g., Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). In large founding 
teams, the potential exists for a much greater range in the strength of relationships among 
team members and supporters. However, because multi-person teams are rare, any findings 
would need to be evaluated accordingly. Finally, in this study, I assumed support networks 
co-evolved with start-up teams. Supporters can play different roles for different stages in the 
start-up process. For example, by helping to recruit an experienced person as a team member, 
advisors reduce founders’ need for future assistance. Additional information on when 
founders began their support relationships would allow for analyses to test this assumption.  
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
I highlight four implications for future research and practice from this study. First, as 
founders’ new organizations establish their legitimacy, their support networks will evolve 
with time, gaining weaker ties to replace an initial core set of strong ties (Aldrich and Ruef 
2006). But in the short term, founders may need to evaluate the overall net benefits of 
working with close ties. Although trustworthy and supportive, relying on strong tie 
supporters, such as family members can hamper founders’ ability to survive and achieve 
milestones in organizational formation (Reynolds and Miller 1992).  
Second, network studies show empirically that local networks can be linked to other 
local networks through bridging ties to form a global network (Watts 2003). However, 
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founders who intend to take steps to bridge to other local networks confront significant 
barriers. Individuals face pressures of homophily to interact and sustain relationships with 
individuals unlike themselves (Kim and Aldrich 2005). Founders face bounded rationality, 
unable to scan beyond their direct ties for complementary partners and supporters (March 
and Simon 1958). Founders require a significant investment of time and energy to maintain 
new relationships with diverse backgrounds, given limits in time and energy. They also will 
need to invest into developing productive negotiated exchanges that are likely to emerge 
from these bridging relationships. 
 Third, if founders can assemble an optimal support network of strong and weak ties, 
the benefits will likely decline over time. Opportunities to access new information and 
resources due to structural holes are greatest in the short-term when the distribution of 
information is not at equilibrium (Aldrich 2006).As individuals increase the level of 
interactions by working together on a new venture, the knowledge shared between the actors 
will increase (Carley 1991). Over time, the benefits derived from their interactions in terms 
of non-overlapping knowledge will decrease. Effective relationships will mature as team 
members and their supporters collaborate, while unproductive relationships will lead to some 
supporters to part ways with founders. Over time, these two factors will diminish the initial 
benefits as the density of strong ties increases. Without new relationships entering regularly 
into a local network of founders and supporters, initially well-endowed ventures (in their 
access to information) may face a liability of adolescence as relationships mature (Brüderl 
and Schussler 1990). This liability also applies to founding teams that lose members. Unless 
relationships have been institutionalized within the new ventures, departing members may 
take with them any potential advisory relationships. Depending on the strength of the 
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relationships, a triadic relationship among all three parties (founding team, departing owner, 
and departing owner’s supporter) may be difficult to sustain.  
Lastly, new ventures must initially rely on existing relationships that founders have 
with other individuals (Aldrich and Ruef 2006; Hite and Hesterly 2001). Without inter-
organizational relationships in place, founding members draw on their experiences and 
backgrounds to develop and maintain relationships with potential supporters. Collectively, 
these relationships contribute to form an external network of supporters for a new 
organization. Over time, if their ventures survive, the founders’ initial support networks may 
evolve into the core of a future inter-organizational exchange network (Brass et al. 2004). For 
example, a friend who responded to a few legal questions in the preliminary planning stages 
may eventually be hired as the new firm’s legal advisor. Thus, individual attachments among 
start-up team members and advisors may evolve into structural attachments (as client/service 
provider) in time (Seabright, Levinthal, and Fichman 1992). With advisory relationships 
unlikely to change dramatically over time, initial support network structures become an 
imprinted feature of new ventures (Stinchcombe 1965). Over reliance by founders on an 
extended network of supporters may indicate a lack of coherence within the start-up effort 
and lead to a shift in power to external providers (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Therefore, in 
addition to issues of resource constraints and legitimacy, studies of organizational emergence 
and survival should account for these support network characteristics. 
 CHAPTER 3: ROUNDING OUT THE TEAM: HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE 
ACQUISITION OF ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN NEW VENTURES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have argued that founders’ human capital plays a critical role in 
entrepreneurial entry, performance, and survival (Brüderl, Preisendörfer, and Ziegler 1992; 
Evans and Leighton 1989; Gimeno et al. 1997). Having established this link, scholars have 
begun to look more closely at how human capital generates favorable entrepreneurial 
outcomes (e.g., Delmar and Shane Forthcoming). Training and experience matter, but what 
remains unclear is how human capital enables founders to take specific actions when 
organizing their new ventures. In this chapter, I explore how founders’ human capital enables 
them to acquire external knowledge to support their organizing efforts. 
To establish how prior training and experience influence organizing processes, I 
adopt the two dimensional classification scheme of general and specific human capital that 
other scholars have used (Becker 1993). In terms of general human capital, such as education 
and general work experience, Evans & Leighton (1989) reported a positive association with 
transitions into entrepreneurship in the United States. Arum & Mueller (2004) provided 
similar evidence in a collection of cross-national studies of 11 advanced industrialized 
countries. In terms of specific human capital, scholars have focused on two forms of training: 
industry and prior entrepreneurial experiences. Bosma, van Praag, Thurik, & de Wit (2004) 
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showed positive effects of industry experience on performance and survival using a sample 
of Dutch entrepreneurs registered in 1994 with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce. Evans & 
Leighton (1989) also argued that prior start-up experience increases the likelihood of 
entrepreneurial entry. Delmar & Shane (Forthcoming) showed non-linear influences of 
industry and prior start-up experience on start-up survival and performance. Building on 
these findings, I explore the influence of founders’ human capital on their entrepreneurial 
decision making, represented by how they seek external knowledge. 
In the early stages of firm creation, founders encounter limited resources, competitive 
pressures, and other constraints that force them to rely principally on their personal 
knowledge accumulated through prior training and experience (Stinchcombe 1965). 
Experienced founders can identify limitations in their own portfolio of skills and abilities 
required to launch their new ventures successfully. By creatively finding ways to enhance 
their own abilities, founders can lower their risks for failure. Drawing on their own 
experiences, founders evaluate their options, such as seeking expertise or imitating successful 
practices to apply to their start-up efforts (Aldrich and Ruef 2006).  
In addition to training and skill development, founders accrue social capital through 
professional networks they develop. Enrolling in formal education programs create 
opportunities for students to form bonds with other classmates, find mentors, and gain access 
to their alumni networks. Working on project teams in established organizations enable 
employees to develop mutual trust and friendships with their colleagues. Professionals 
involved in a particular industry can form ties with suppliers, customers, regulators, and other 
stakeholders. Founders can take advantage of their professional relationships, cultivated 
through training programs and work experience, to call upon for assistance. Nahapiet & 
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Ghoshal (1998) described how social relationships facilitate the development of knowledge 
within organizations. Within existing relationships, founders can take advantage of a 
common cognitive and relationship foundation to support potential collaborations. This 
approach to securing external knowledge stands in contrast to more strategically-oriented 
explanations in which founders benefit by forming closer relationships with distant ties in 
their network or developing new relationships with previously unconnected individuals (Burt 
1992). According to this explanation, founders gain novel and timely information by working 
with strangers due to access outside their local networks. Therefore, in this paper, I also 
investigate how founders’ social capital guides their acquisition of external knowledge.  
In the following sections, I develop a theoretical background and a set of testable 
hypotheses for the role of human and social capital to support founders as they develop their 
new ventures. I test these hypotheses using the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics 
(PSED), a nationally representative random sample of nascent entrepreneurs who are actively 
working to start new businesses. After reporting my findings, I conclude with implications 
for our current theoretical understanding of founders’ human capital and propose areas for 
future research. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Scholars have argued that new ventures started by experienced founders are more 
likely to grow and survive (Brüderl et al. 1992; Delmar and Shane Forthcoming). To develop 
this argument, researchers relied on the assumption that prior investments in human capital 
enable founders to take appropriate actions and make relevant decisions during the 
organizing process.  This assumption is consistent with Coleman’s (1988) comparison of the 
value of physical and human capital: “Just as physical capital is created by changes in 
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materials to form tools that facilitate production, human capital is created by changes in 
persons that bring about skills and capabilities that make them able to act in new ways.” 
(S100). In this study, I make this assumption more explicit by examining how founders 
access external knowledge using their human capital. I also explore whether founders 
achieve more favorable start-up outcomes by accumulating external knowledge.  
I follow a competence-based framework that directly links human capital to skills and 
distinguishes between general and specific forms of human capital (Becker 1993; Colombo 
and Grilli 2005). From this perspective, I assume that individuals equipped with general 
skills can transfer and apply them to situations beyond the primary settings for which they 
were initially trained. For example, founders can secure favorable terms from potential 
suppliers or persuade skeptical customers to consider a new product offering using 
negotiating skills acquired when previously working in sales environments. Founders 
equipped with general skills draw from a pool of broad business knowledge to assess 
business opportunities and execute operational decisions.  
In contrast to general skills, specialized training applies more narrowly to a particular 
setting, such as learning unique routines for an organization. For example, founders can take 
advantage of their specialized skills by starting a new business in the same industry where 
their skills were acquired. Sorenson & Audia (2000) described the high geographic 
concentration of new business activity in the footwear industry. To account for this 
concentration, they explained that experienced managers would leave their positions in older, 
established firms to start competing firms nearby. In addition to technical skills, specialized 
training may also apply to mastering other skills, such as managing employees within a 
distinctive corporate culture.  
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Benefits from Human Capital 
Founders who intend to start new businesses benefit from their general and specific 
human capital in three ways: skill development, decision making abilities, and social network 
formation. First, skill development occurs through declarative memory, such as concepts 
learned within a classroom setting, or through procedural memory, such as learning routines 
and replicating existing practices during on the job training (Cohen and Bacdayan 1994; 
Polanyi 1966). Second, while formal training enables skill development, on the job training 
provides opportunities for gaining tacit knowledge and other aids to making business 
decisions. Third, obtaining human capital through educational institutions and established 
organizations provide founders opportunities to form professional networks. In the following 
sections, I describe these three benefits from accumulated human capital in greater detail. 
Skill development 
Through work experience, founders can acquire fundamental skills which are 
necessary to start new businesses. By working in positions that expose them to technical, 
managerial, and other functional skills, founders can draw on this knowledge as they launch 
their new organizations. In addition to honing specific functional skills, founders also benefit 
from having a broad range of experiences. For example, in larger organizations, managerial 
trainees work in multiple departments and are exposed to a wide range of operational 
scenarios. Having breadth of skills, especially in marketing and management can further 
assist founders in organizing their ventures due to the number of issues that relate to these 
areas (Roberts 1991; Shane 2003). By developing expertise in certain skills and gaining 
exposure to others, founders can learn “on the job” and avoid making similar mistakes when 
starting their own ventures. When this learning occurs while working for someone else, 
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founders benefit from direct and indirect training costs incurred by their employers. Although 
scholars tend to consider the cumulative impact of work experience on entrepreneurial 
activity, Dobrev and Barnett (2005) argued that skills acquired during recent work 
experiences may have a more pronounced effect based on their study of entrepreneurs who 
were alumni from an elite MBA program. The impact of recent work experiences is most 
likely relevant to specialized training. Founders trained in current technologies bring to their 
new ventures considerable awareness of the latest technical requirements and issues. 
Founders who are not “current” in their training may face a significant learning curve in 
order to update their prior experiences.  
 Founders also acquire skills through formal educational opportunities. While 
secondary and college-level education provide individuals with opportunities to develop 
general critical thinking, analytical, and communication skills, founders who complete 
elective courses and advanced degree programs are likely to obtain more specialized skills. 
Trade schools allow students to concentrate on a particular craft, while graduate schools 
enable students to become qualified in a specialized field. Students who complete business 
courses and degree programs acquire both general and specific business skills. Inexperienced 
founders can acquire specific business knowledge by attending seminars and workshops 
specifically designed for individuals who wish to start a business. In contrast, students who 
enroll in formal business degree programs typically complete a comprehensive curriculum of 
courses in finance, accounting, marketing, and strategy. Additionally, students in degree 
programs who specialize in entrepreneurship can learn more specific skills related to the 
founding process. For example, through these focused programs, students are taught how to 
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generate pro forma financial statements, write effective business plans, and pitch their 
concepts to potential investors. 
 Although practical experience and formal education may emphasize distinct forms of 
training, Becker (1993) described how two forms of training can also support one another in 
their outcomes. On the job training can reinforce theoretical concepts taught in the classroom 
(Polanyi 1966). For example, executing an effective marketing strategy for a new business 
often requires more than implementing steps learned in a marketing class. Principles acquired 
from a textbook can be reinforced by designing plans aimed at actual implementation. Work 
experience can also spur additional classroom training. Graduate business programs are 
designed for students to build on their previous work experience. As a result, the impact of 
these skills on new venture success should be viewed as a complementary relationship 
between founders’ education and work experience. 
Judgment and decision making 
 In addition to skill development, founders gain tacit knowledge by working closely 
with seasoned experts. On the job training provides a setting for founders to learn 
complicated information that may be difficult to transfer in a classroom setting (Polanyi 
1966). Founders may exercise better business judgment for making critical operational 
decisions during early stages of the start-up process by relying on their tacit knowledge 
gained through prior experience. By combining tacit knowledge with other general skills, 
founders can develop cognitive templates from their earlier experiences and use them as 
frameworks to execute decisions for their new ventures (Walsh 1995). Founders may rely on 
these cognitive templates more deeply when starting businesses in the same industry or 
relying on similar functional processes learned during their previous training (Aldrich and 
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Ruef 2006). Experience in a start-up environment provides founders with first-hand 
knowledge of executing business decisions in a resource constrained environment (Baker and 
Nelson 2005). Founders with start-up experience may also have a greater sensitivity towards 
pacing of start-up activities and understanding potential consequences of every action 
undertaken. For example, founders may face ongoing decisions regarding whether to 
complete certain tasks internally or to solicit external assistance. Founders who have started 
successful businesses may recognize how and when to rely on external assistance to 
supplement internal expertise. Successful entrepreneurs may also act with more caution, 
guided by their awareness of effective strategies and likelihood for imitating practices that 
work (Haunschild and Miner 1997).  
Social network formation 
As a third benefit from human capital development, founders have opportunities to 
form their professional networks as students in formal educational programs or employees in 
established organizations.  In these settings, project assignments, committee responsibilities, 
or other forms of collaborative work enable classmates and co-workers to interact and 
develop working relationships. As a result of these interactions, founders are likely to 
maintain their trusted and mutually supportive relationships. Depending on the level of 
closeness, founders may call upon these associates for trusted advice or expertise without 
feeling a need to compensate them for their services (Uzzi 1996).  
Founders may have also developed mentoring relationships with faculty or 
supervisors. Similar to working relationships established with colleagues, founders with 
strong mentoring relationships may continue their interactions with trusted counsellors after 
graduation or rotating off a project team. Given their particular expertise and prior 
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experiences, mentoring relationships provide founders another valuable resource for advice 
and knowledge. 
Founders can expand their network by taking advantage of their alumni affiliation. 
Networking forums, such as alumni clubs, directories, and online networking websites can 
support founders in search of assistance from fellow alumni. Founders can explore their 
alumni networks to identify future employees or potential customers. Introductions from 
network contacts may provide founders access to other restricted networks, such as business 
roundtables or associations. Founders may turn to faculty members of their alma maters as 
another source of expertise by requesting their advice informally in conversations or more 
formally through their participation on advisory boards. 
To summarize, founders can benefit from their accumulated human capital in three 
primary ways: acquiring general and specific skills; gaining tacit knowledge to aid in 
decision making; and developing professional networks. In the following section, I describe 
how founders use these characteristics to evaluate the level of organizational knowledge in 
their nascent firms and their search for external knowledge.   
HUMAN CAPITAL AND ACQUISITION OF ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
As a part of the start-up process, founders in new firms begin to develop their 
organizational infrastructure. Founders rely initially on their accumulated human capital to 
create new roles and routines unique to their nascent organizations (Stinchcombe 1965). In 
nascent firms, these roles and routines focus primarily on mobilizing resources, developing 
initial products and services, and achieving other start-up milestones. Experienced and well-
trained founders may respond to these organizing demands more effectively. Founders can 
utilize their previously acquired skills and elect to work fairly independently, especially 
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during initial stages of venture development. Founders aware of proven practices can imitate 
them in their own start-up efforts (Aldrich and Ruef 2006).  
Founders with limited experience may turn to external knowledge providers for more 
specialized assistance. External knowledge providers can help founders launch their 
businesses in new industries or geographic regions where founders’ expertise is limited. 
Inexperienced founders may acquire information specific to particular industries, such as 
regulatory requirements, market conditions, and competitive dynamics more efficiently 
through external providers. Founders may elect to recruit seasoned managers to grow a 
nascent business upon establishment (Boeker and Karichalil 2002). Founders may align with 
external knowledge providers formally by recruiting them as team members or forge 
relationships with experts to provide assistance on a more ad-hoc basis. For these reasons, I 
expect: 
Hypothesis 1: As founders’ human capital increases, the likelihood of requesting 
external knowledge decreases. 
 
Without established roles and standardized routines, new firms face elevated risks of 
failing (Stinchcombe 1965). As a temporary remedy, he suggested, “New organizations have 
to get by with generalized skills produced outside the organization, or have to invest in 
education (including especially the cost of inefficiency until people learn their roles) (148).” 
Founders can address this issue of insufficient organizational knowledge in four different 
ways. First, founders may hire qualified individuals as employees. Second, founders may 
identify specific needs and purchase these services. From a long-term perspective, these first 
two strategies provide significant advantages to founders. Investments into hiring employees 
can institutionalize core routines in new firms and develop asset specificity within their 
organizational infrastructure (Williamson 1981). Hiring consultants or specialists to provide 
 45 
specific business services allows for greater flexibility in addressing organizational needs. 
However, founders are unlikely to pursue these strategies in the short-term. These options 
require founders to devote substantial financial resources that may be unavailable during 
early stages of starting a new business.  
Founders may be more inclined to pursue two alternative options to acquire external 
knowledge in the short-term that do not require considerable resource investments. First, 
founders may recruit additional team members with relevant skills and experiences. For their 
initial investment of time and financial resources, founders can offer future equity to these 
recruited owners in the new firm without any significant short-term financial outlays. Second, 
founders may look to their professional network to solicit their assistance as advisors to their 
start-up efforts. By calling on these individuals, founders may receive assistance without any 
immediate expectation for financial remuneration.   
Founders may encounter situations for which their previous training and accumulated 
knowledge are insufficient. Under these circumstances, founders still rely on their human 
capital to guide them as they search for these external knowledge providers. Using their 
experience, founders can identify what types of assistance to solicit and potential sources to 
consider. General knowledge may not be as critical to acquire, especially if founders have 
sufficient general training that allows founders to address basic issues they encounter during 
day to day operations. However, specific knowledge, such as technical skills or developing a 
marketing plan may be sought to supplement existing abilities of founders. Founders who are 
experienced managers may delegate certain tasks in order to focus on achieving central 
organizing milestones. Founders with start-up experience may understand how and when 
 46 
external experts can provide additional support for specific start-up tasks. For these reasons, I 
expect: 
Hypothesis 2a: As founders’ human capital increases, the likelihood of obtaining 
general knowledge externally decreases.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: As founders’ human capital increases, the likelihood of obtaining 
specific knowledge externally increases.  
 
 Founders with poorly developed social networks are limited in their ability to recruit 
knowledgeable experts. Stinchombe (1965:148) explained, “Clearly, the distribution and 
generality of skills outside the organization, the socially induced capacity to learn new roles 
(especially without visible role models), and the ease of recruitment of skills to new 
organizations will affect the degree of disadvantage of organizational innovations.” In 
principle, founders can pursue multiple channels for acquiring external knowledge. However, 
founders are likely to request assistance initially from individuals with whom relationships 
exist (Granovetter 1985). By relying on their direct ties, founders can trust their assistance 
and expect a greater willingness by these knowledge providers to support their founding 
efforts (Coleman 1988). Over time, if their new ventures progress, founders can move 
beyond their initial core network of advisors and strategically identify experts with whom no 
prior relations exist. However, in the short-term, founders are more likely to turn to their 
professional network, such as colleagues and business associates. By coming from similar 
professional backgrounds, founders share narratives, codes, and other cognitive dimensions 
with their colleagues that enable them to work effectively together (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
1998). Founders can feel confident that their professional colleagues will provide assistance 
in a timely and dependable manner (Uzzi 1996). Founders can benefit from their colleagues’ 
expertise when faced with specific issues that require relevant knowledge in selected 
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industries or geographic regions (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman 1990). For these 
reasons, I expect:  
Hypothesis 3: Founders are more likely to turn to their professional colleagues than 
other individuals to solicit external knowledge.  
 
 Scholars have shown that higher levels of human capital among founders increase the 
likelihood for new venture survival (Brüderl et al. 1992; Delmar and Shane Forthcoming). 
One explanation for this relationship centers on how founders effectively assemble 
knowledge in order to achieve organizing milestones. By marshalling expertise through their 
professional networks, founders are likely to raise the level of organizational knowledge 
required to sustain the start-up effort. With assistance from recruited team members and 
advisors, founders may efficiently identify new financial resources, meet customer needs 
through their intended products and services, and negotiate favorable terms with their 
suppliers. For these reasons, I expect:  
Hypothesis 4: As organizational knowledge increases, founders are less likely to 
abandon their start-up efforts. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
I analyzed data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), a 
nationally representative sample of nascent entrepreneurs in the United States actively 
starting new businesses. To form the sample, a two-stage design was used. In the first stage, 
59,575 adults, aged 18 years and older, residing within the contiguous 48 states of the United 
States, were selected between July, 1998 and January, 2000 using random digit dialing 
(RDD) methodology. These individuals completed a screening interview which contained 
four qualifying questions. Individuals qualified as nascent entrepreneurs if they expected to 
be majority owners of new businesses they had been actively trying to start within the last 12 
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months. Owners reporting firms with positive cash flow for at least three months or majority 
institutional ownership did not qualify. This initial screening interview resulted in a pool of 
1,164 eligible individuals who could be located. From this pool, individuals were randomly 
drawn and invited to participate in the full study. In this second stage, 830 individuals, which 
included women and minority over-samples, completed the full survey, for a response rate of 
71 percent.  Respondents reported information on their new ventures, team members and 
members of their external support networks. The University of Michigan’s Institute for 
Social Research oversaw the final data collection efforts. A complete description of the 
study’s background, sampling methodology, and response rates can be found in Gartner et al. 
(2004b).  
Due to various reasons, I dropped 23 cases from the final sample. Fourteen cases of 
the 23 cases were dropped due to lack of majority ownership by nascent entrepreneur(s) 
(seven cases), maturity of the new business based on three months of positive cash flow (six 
cases), or missing team data (one case) (Ruef et al. 2003). After reviewing start-up activity 
information, I dropped an additional nine cases based on four reasons: misinterpretation of 
questions (two cases), no reported start-up activity (three cases), and start-up too advanced 
based on timing of accomplished activities (four cases). In my analyses, I used an effective 
sample of 807 cases. 
The nascent entrepreneurs in the sample responded to two name generator questions. 
The first question asked for names of other individuals who would share in ownership of the 
new venture. I refer to these individuals as members of the start-up team. The second 
question asked for names of people who have been helpful in the start-up process, but not 
members of the start-up team. I refer to this set of individuals as the external support network. 
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For both name generators, respondents could provide up to five names and for each 
individual identified, a set of name interpreter questions were asked.  
I utilized individual case weights calculated by the Institute for Survey Research at 
the University of Michigan for the PSED. These weights accounted for differences in 
selection probabilities based on age, education, race, and sex (based on the Current 
Population Surveys conducted by the U.S. Census) and corrected for differences due to 
differential non-response rates (Curtin and Reynolds 2004). 
Variables 
 Human capital variables: I assigned two types of human capital variables for each 
respondent, consistent with previous research (Brüderl et al. 1992; Colombo and Grilli 2005; 
Schoonhoven et al. 1990). For general human capital, I created three variables. Education is a 
five category variable (up to high school; vocational/technical training; some college; college 
graduate; and post-college). Years of general full-time work experience (net of managerial 
experience) and managerial experience are continuous measures (in years). For specific 
human capital, I created four variables. Industry work experience is a continuous measure (in 
years). Previous start-up experience is a dichotomous variable (1=yes). To assess the effects 
of current business ownership, I developed a four category variable based on the 
respondent’s paid employment status: (1) people who said they were business owners or self-
employed with no other jobs; (2) owners or self-employed persons who also worked for an 
employer for less than 35 hours per week; and (3) owners or self-employed persons who also 
worked for an employer for more than 35 hours per week. This distinction provides the 
ability to assess whether respondents rely on additional external knowledge given their level 
of dedication to the start-up attempt. I also denoted founders who completed classes or 
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workshops on starting a business as a dichotomous variable (1=yes). Education (both formal 
and business start-up), general and managerial experience, and current business ownership 
information were available only for the respondent.   
 Knowledge contribution variables: Respondents provided information on four types 
of organizational knowledge contributed by each team member and supporter to their start-up 
effort. I designated information and advice and training in start-up related business skills as 
general knowledge contributions and providing business services and having previous start-
up experience as specialized knowledge contributions. I created separate dichotomous 
variables for each team member to indicate whether a contribution was made (1=yes). I also 
totaled the number of contributing team members to create a continuous summary variable 
for each type of knowledge contribution. I repeated this procedure for the set of supporters. 
For solo start-ups and those without any supporters, I assumed the start-up effort did not 
receive any external knowledge contributions. Their contributions were coded as zero. 
 Relationship characteristics variables: I created a set of variables describing the 
dyadic relationship between the respondent and team member or supporter prior to joining or 
assisting the start-up effort. For start-up team members only, respondents reported role 
relations between ego/alter. Respondents chose from five categories (spouse/partner; 
relative/family members; business associates/work colleagues; friends/acquaintances; 
strangers before joining the team) to describe each relationship within the start-up team. I 
combined the first two categories (i.e., family) and created a four category team relationship 
variable. For the support network, respondents reported role relations between ego and alter 
from the following six categories (spouse/partner; relative/family members; business 
associates/work colleagues; friends/acquaintances; teacher/counselor; other type of 
 51 
relationship). I combined the first two (i.e., family) and created a five category support 
relationship variable. Fourteen new ventures reported having a non-person team member 
holding a minority ownership stake (e.g., financial institution, business). For these cases, I 
excluded the relations between other team members and non-person entities. 
Team size variables: I included net start-up team size based on the number of owners 
(excluding the respondent) and the support network size based on the number of supporters 
reported. Because name generator questions did not capture the full information on 
contributions for 39 respondents who reported having more than five supporters, I created an 
indicator variable to mark these cases.  
Control variables: I included three control variables. To account for differences in 
knowledge requirements across industries, I created a four category industrial sector measure 
(primary/manufacturing; retail/wholesale; consumer/support services; professional services) 
based on 1997 NAICS coding scheme. I included organizing time to account for the length of 
time founders have been working on their ventures. Respondents reported if and when 25 
start-up activities (e.g., purchasing raw materials, writing a business plan, etc.) occurred. I 
calculated organizing time based on the number of months between their earliest reported 
activity and time of interview. (See Appendix A for details.) I took the natural logarithm of 
organizing time to correct for skewness. Finally, I created an indicator variable to distinguish 
the 13 percent of new ventures affiliated with an external sponsor such as a franchisor or 
multi-level marketing firm. I included this variable to account for founders who may have 
access to a wider network of resources through their sponsors. 
I provide descriptive statistics for these variables in Table 3.1. A sizeable proportion 
of founders have some form of previous start-up (43 percent) or current business ownership 
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(46 percent) experience. Forty-two percent of founders have completed a course on starting a 
business.  On average, start-up teams are relatively small, with founders working in teams of 
less than two and receiving assistance from two supporters. Approximately 60 percent of the 
new ventures are in the consumer or professional services sectors. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE] 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
To test Hypotheses 1, I estimated the relationship between the respondent’s human 
capital variables and the number of additional members of the team and support network 
recruited to the start-up effort (Table 3.2). Since these are count variables, I used negative 
binomial regression models to estimate these relationships (n=792, based on listwise 
deletion). Based on regression diagnostics, I did not observe any indications of collinearity 
(VIF values were less than two).  
[INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE] 
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, increasing human capital decreased the likelihood of 
recruiting additional members of the team and support network. Founders with previous and 
current start-up experience were less likely to recruit additional team members (Model 1). 
The expected number of additional team members decreased by 16 percent (i.e., 100*exp-.17-
1) for founders with previous start-up experience and by 25 percent for founders who 
currently own a separate business. Founders with more general full-time and managerial 
experience were less likely to recruit supporters (Model 2). These negative relationships 
suggest that founders who had sufficient accumulated experience were less likely to solicit 
external assistance. However, the influence of experience differed between team and support 
network recruitment. Specifically, founders with greater specific human capital were less 
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likely to recruit additional team members, while founders with greater general human capital 
were less likely to solicit assistance from their support network.  
The one exception to this explanation was education. Founders with higher levels 
education were more likely to recruit an additional team member (Model 1), but education 
had no effect on recruiting supporters. Depending on the level of education, the expected 
number of team members increased by 35 to 62 percent. One possible explanation for these 
divergent results centers on the relevance of human capital acquired through education about 
the start-up process. Although they learned basic skills through classroom training, founders 
may still need to recruit additional team members due to a lack of relevant business training 
in their curriculum. Unfortunately, respondents did not provide more specific educational 
background information, such as their majors or completed courses to test this explanation. 
Alternatively, more highly educated founders may benefit from their larger social networks 
and have more opportunities for collaborations. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE] 
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, I estimated the relationship between founders’ human 
and social capital and the type of knowledge they acquired. Since the outcome variables were 
dichotomous, I used logistic regression models (n=379 for team members; n=478 for 
supporters – based on listwise deletion). In these two sets of models, I restricted the analyses 
to only team-based start-up attempts and attempts that reported working with at least one 
external supporter respectively. Because information about contributions from members of 
the team and support network was nested in start-up attempts, I clustered the analyses by 
each attempt to account for the non-independence among contributors and used the 
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Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance. In Table 3.3, I present results from these 
analyses. 
In Hypothesis 2a, I predicted that as founders’ human capital increases, general 
knowledge acquisition will decrease. I found partial support for this hypothesis. In terms of 
general knowledge contributions, founders’ general human capital had little impact. For each 
year of managerial experience, the odds of requesting advice from their team members 
decreased by three percent (Model 1a). With their accumulated experience, founders may 
rely on their personal skills and general business acumen rather than actively recruit 
additional team members primarily for the advice they can contribute. Highly educated 
founders were also less likely to request external business training.  
Specific human capital, however, influenced both team member and support network 
recruitment for general knowledge. The odds were approximately 50 to 80 percent higher for 
founders who completed a business start-up course to have a team member or supporter 
provide advice or training in start-up related business skills (Models 1b, 2a, 2b). Contrary to 
expectations, founders’ industry experience had a negative relationship with having 
supporters provide information and advice (Model 1b). One explanation for this negative 
relationship may be attributed to the lack of precision in capturing the type of information 
and advice offered. Respondents may have reported the extent to which their supporters 
contributed general information and advice. Experienced founders may have already 
established considerable understanding of their industry and have little need initially for 
general advice. Based on these mixed results, I found partial support for Hypothesis 2a. 
I found stronger support for Hypothesis 2b. Higher levels of founders’ human capital 
tended to increase the likelihood of specialized knowledge contributions by members of the 
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team and support network. In terms of general human capital, depending on the level of 
education, the odds of recruiting both members of the team and support network to provide 
business services to the start-up effort increased by 1.8 to 2.3 times (Models 3a and 3b). For 
each year of managerial experience, the odds of recruiting both members of the team and 
support network who have start-up experience increased by about two to three percent 
(Models 4a and 4b). This positive relationship may reflect a greater willingness of 
experienced founders to organize their emerging businesses by delegating to their more 
experienced team members. Contrary to expectations, higher education produced a negative 
relationship for founders recruiting a team member with start-up experience.  
For specific human capital, the odds of recruiting a team member to contribute 
business services to the start-up effort increased by three percent for each year of industry 
experience (Model 3a). Entrepreneurs with significant industry experience have a greater 
understanding of specific business services to employ during start-up and may seek these 
skills among potential team members. For founders who owned a business and worked for 
someone else full-time, the odds increased by almost 70 percent (Model 3a). Having previous 
start-up experience nearly doubled the odds that founders recruited supporters to contribute 
business services to the start-up effort (Model 3b). Founders with start-up experience also 
were more likely to recruit team members (3.5 times as likely) with start-up experience 
(Model 4a).  
I found partial support for Hypothesis 3 where I predicted that founders looked to 
their business associates and work colleagues for general knowledge contributions. Founders 
were 3.3 times as likely to have a colleague (compared to strangers) as team member provide 
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information and advice (Model 1a).1 Founders were over six times as likely to have a teacher 
or counselor as an advisor to provide training in start-up business skills (Model 2b).  
Contrary to expectations, when recruiting for business services contributions or start-
up expertise, business colleagues did not produce a statistically significant relationship for 
either team members or supporters. Instead, strangers were more likely than family and 
friends to be recruited for their business services contributions (Ruef et al. 2003). Based on 
these results, founders sought out highly skilled team members by foregoing their business 
colleagues in favor of strangers.  
In Hypothesis 4, I predicted that as organizational knowledge increased, founders 
were less likely to abandon their founding attempts. To test this prediction, I estimated the 
relationship between organizational knowledge and the rate at which founders quit the start-
up process. Respondents became at-risk for quitting their new ventures after the first 
qualified start-up activity occurred. (Refer to Appendix A for details.) The outcome event 
was whether respondents quit their start-up efforts. A total of 311 respondents reported 
quitting their new ventures. I updated support network and team covariate information at the 
following time points: start-up team formation dates, interview dates (up to four), and quit 
date (if applicable). For the control variables and kinship variables among team and support 
networks, I used their initial values and did not update them over time.  
I assumed all start-ups started as solo ventures initially. Team size was updated at the 
time of start-up team formation. For 101 cases, respondents reported start-up team formation 
as their first start-up activity. For these cases, I assigned team size reported at the first 
interview for the initial spell. For 152 cases, respondents reported forming a start-up team 
                                                 
1
 In Model 1b, due to lack of cases where advisors who contributed to information and were not previously 
connected to the respondent, I used “friends/acquaintances” as the reference category. 
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prior to the initial interview, but reported being a solo owner at the first interview. Because 
the respondent did not provide any information on their former teammates, I assumed team 
size to be one since the beginning of their start-up activities. For teams that experienced 
ownership changes after the first interview, I assumed they occurred shortly after the last 
recorded interview, because respondents did not disclose when any changes in ownership 
occurred. For example, if the respondent reported two owners at the second interview, I 
assigned the value of two for team size between the first and second interview spell.  
[INSERT TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 3.4, I report results for the piecewise exponential models. The underlying 
functional form follows a non-monotonic trajectory consistent with the liability of 
adolescence theory (Brüderl and Schussler 1990; Stinchcombe 1965). Ventures between 24 
and 48 months in age quit at over four times (i.e., exp6.21-4.78 – based on Model 1) the rate of 
younger ventures between 0 and 12 months of start-up. After peaking during the 24 to 48 
month time segment, the rate of quitting decreased for ventures greater than 48 months.  
In these four models, I used continuous summary variables that are based on the 
number of team member and supporters who contributed to the founding effort. I found 
general support for Hypothesis 4. In Models 1 and 2, I included the four types of knowledge 
contributed by members of the team and support network respectively. For each additional 
team member that contributed information and advice, the hazard rate decreased by 20 
percent. In both models, for each additional team member or supporter who provided 
business services, the hazard rate decreased by about 40 and 20 percent, respectively. In 
Model 3, when both sets of contribution variables were included jointly, the magnitude of the 
hazard rates remained fairly similar. In Model 4, I included the founders’ human capital 
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variables. The hazard rate for information and advice contributions increased (to 30 percent) 
and business services contribution for team members slightly weakened (to 35 percent). The 
statistical relationship for supporters was no longer significant. 
By comparing these results with those reported in Table 3.3, a more nuanced 
explanation of founders’ human capital emerged. Founders appeared to rely on different 
approaches to acquiring the two forms of external knowledge that reduced the hazard rate. To 
recruit team members for information and advice, founders primarily relied on their 
professional network (Model 1a). In contrast, to recruit team members for business services 
contributions, founders’ human capital, rather than their professional relationships, produced 
significant results (Model 3a). These divergent explanations suggest that founders may need 
to selectively rely on their existing professional network to acquire external knowledge. 
Additionally, although founders were more likely to turn to strangers for business training, 
this particular contribution did not reduce the hazard rate of quitting. 
Among founders’ human capital variables, only specific human capital reduced the 
likelihood of abandoning the start-up effort (Model 4). All three current business ownership 
variables generated statistically significant relationships. Depending on the level of 
commitment, current business ownership reduced the hazard rate by about 60 to 70 percent. 
Founders who ran separate businesses benefited from their specialized “on the job” training. 
Current business ownership also implied a greater degree of success in the founders’ prior 
start-up experiences. Because of its quality and relevance, founders could directly transfer 
lessons learned from their concurrent business involvement to their new start-up efforts. 
In contrast to current business ownership, previous start-up experience generated no 
statistically significant results. Although founders with previous start-up experience 
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abandoned at a slower rate, recruiting members of the team and support network with 
previous start-up experience had no impact. This is consistent with earlier findings (e.g., 
Schoonhoven et al. 1990). One explanation may stem from the likelihood that the previous 
start-up experience measure captures mainly failed attempts (Kim, Aldrich, and Keister 
2006). Reynolds and White (1997) reported approximately one-half of nascent entrepreneurs 
abandon their start-up efforts. Facing the liabilities of newness, newly formed organizations 
still encounter high risks of failure. Because the previous start-up experience measure in 
PSED did not distinguish between successful and failed attempts, alternative explanations 
cannot be analyzed more thoroughly. However, the lack of a significant relationship may be 
due in part to the inability of nascent entrepreneurs to learn sufficiently from their start-up 
experiences or to apply what they learned to their current start-up effort. Perhaps the previous 
start-up efforts did not last long enough to generate specific organizational knowledge to 
transfer.  
Alternatively, the quality of the start-up experience measure is unclear. Experience 
may range from working as an employee for a newly founded firm to having direct day to 
day operational decision making responsibility as a manager or owner in new ventures. 
Again, this particular measure in the PSED does not provide this level of distinction. Given 
Delmar & Shane’s (Forthcoming) non-linear finding for start-up experience, current business 
ownership, rather than prior start-up experience, provides a better indicator of what type of 
start-up experience has a stronger influence on entrepreneurial survival.  
Founders benefited from two other forms of specific human capital. The completion 
of a business start-up course reduced the hazard rate by almost 30 percent. Industry work 
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experience also reduced the likelihood of abandoning the start-up effort. For every year of 
average team industry work experience, the hazard rate decreased by about three percent.  
In terms of results for the control variables, the hazard rates for start-ups affiliated 
with an external sponsor were higher than de novo unaffiliated start-ups. Additionally, hazard 
rates for larger start-ups were also higher. Unless founders recruit and receive relevant 
organizational knowledge from their teammates, larger start-ups are more likely to fail 
potentially due to coordination issues among team members. Knowledge specialization 
allows each team member to fulfill specific roles on start-up teams. Without the 
specialization, nascent firms cannot develop their organizational infrastructure and overcome 
their “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe 1965). 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, I explored how founders’ human capital influences their entrepreneurial 
decision making in terms of their ability to acquire external knowledge. In summary, 
founders with higher levels of human capital were less likely to recruit additional team 
members or solicit advice from experts. However, when external knowledge was sought, 
founders were guided by their specific human capital. Reliance on business associates and 
strangers differed on the form of general knowledge solicited. Founders in start-up attempts 
supported by general knowledge contributions (information and advice) and specialized 
knowledge (business services) were less likely to abandon their ventures. 
I highlight several features of the PSED study design to describe the context for 
which these results should be evaluated. Addressing issues related to these design features 
can also serve as the basis for future research. First, because respondents reported 
information for each alter and relationships between alters, the PSED collected only one slice 
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of the respondents’ cognitive social network (Krackhardt 1987). Respondents did not 
distinguish whether supporters nominated through the name-interpreter questions were 
recruited by other team members. Respondents can report some attributes for alters, such as 
their gender, racial, or family relations, with minimal uncertainty (White and Watkins 2000). 
However, when requesting more detailed information (such as educational and financial 
background), ego-based reports will likely result in increased non-response or measurement 
error. Collecting this type of information would require alters to be interviewed directly.  
Second, because the survey design utilized an ego based data collection strategy, I 
assumed that the respondent (ego) was the primary founder of each new venture. This 
allowed me to take advantage of the complete human capital information available for each 
respondent. Without additional information on directionality, I also assumed that ego 
initiated the recruitment of alters. If human capital information was available for alters, I 
could assess whether founders sought complementary skills and training backgrounds if 
human capital effects were consistent in both directions. A complete network study may 
identify additional insights on how alters perceive their recruitment and knowledge 
contributions.  
 Third, additional precise measures of both human capital and organizational 
knowledge measures could yield deeper insights. In terms of human capital, specific 
information on educational accomplishments, such as majors and concentrations could help 
identify whether founders received training in a particular field of study. Measures of success 
in previous start-up experience may be conveyed through length of spells in prior business 
ownership, work in start-up environment, or prior business revenues and assets (Carroll and 
Mosakowski 1987; Dunn and Holtz-Eakin 2000). In terms of knowledge contributions, 
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distinguishing which types of advice and business services offered by members of the team 
and support network can further enhance interpretations of how founders’ human capital 
influence their acquisition. For example, by knowing whether founders solicited industry-
related or functional advice, influence of prior experience in these areas can be assessed. 
Timing of when knowledge was sought and received would generate further explanations of 
how founders recruited external providers. 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In this paper, I use a competency-based framework to explain how founders employ 
their prior training and experiences to acquire external knowledge. I highlight five 
contributions and implications to theory and practice. First, human capital theory has 
emerged as one explanation of how and why investments in particular types of training lead 
to differential outcomes (Becker 1993). Labor market studies traditionally have examined 
human capital investment on personal income. For organization and entrepreneurship 
scholars, human capital theory can be used to develop explanations for entrepreneurial entry 
and survival (e.g., Gimeno et al. 1997). Are there particular training regimens or trajectories 
that lead to more favorable entrepreneurial outcomes, due to better decision making and 
knowledge acquisition capabilities? Based on these analyses, I suggest that founders with 
varied training and experiences spanning both general and specific knowledge are well 
positioned to make decisions leading to successful new ventures.  
Second, some scholars have argued that having entrepreneurial family background 
provides a setting for acquiring relevant organizational knowledge. Children can learn 
business skills from their parents, especially by working for them during their adolescent and 
young adult years (Aldrich, Renzulli, and Langton 1998; Carroll and Mosakowski 1987). 
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Dunn & Holtz-Eakin (2000) argued that individuals with parents who are successful 
entrepreneurs (measured by the period of parental self-employment, business assets, and 
business income) are more likely to become entrepreneurs themselves. Sørensen (2007) also 
reported that family background is positively associated with first entry, especially when 
parents are self-employed during and after their children’s adolescence. If founders with 
entrepreneurial family backgrounds benefit from this form of training, human capital 
acquired during their adult years is likely to reinforce this earlier training (Aldrich and Kim 
2007). 
Third, in this analysis, I assume that prior training and experience provide a setting 
for founders to develop heuristics to employ when faced with making important decisions in 
their start-up efforts. However, what remains unclear are the mechanisms by which founders 
develop these “knowledge structures” that allow them to make decisions effectively and 
efficiently (Walsh 1995). Integrating human capital and managerial cognition theories can 
lead to a deeper understanding of how founders acquire their knowledge structures and 
whether specific knowledge structures lead to favorable entrepreneurial outcomes. For 
example, founders who start new businesses in industries with established dominant designs 
are more likely to imitate these practices (Aldrich and Ruef 2006). 
 Fourth, in this analysis, I argued that founders have two short-term, low-cost 
strategies available to them for acquiring external knowledge. This competency-based 
framework can be extended to assess whether founders’ human capital influence their longer-
term strategies, such as hiring employees or independent contractors and purchasing 
specialized business services. I have also referred to short and long-term strategies somewhat 
generically. The timing of both sets of knowledge acquisition strategies can also be explored 
 64 
in greater detail by examining whether certain types of knowledge affects other milestones 
during the start-up process.   
Finally, founders form teams and work with supporters based on their prior 
relationships (Ruef et al. 2003). However, it is not clear whether accessing external 
knowledge through these relationships benefit the founding process. Although working with 
business colleagues to gain counsel and advice reduced the hazard of quitting, none of the 
external knowledge contributed by members of the team and support network had a similar 
effect. Are entrepreneurs able to weigh the benefits of working with individuals within their 
social and professional networks with the quality of their contributions? Founders are 
unlikely to make such decisions while embedded in their network of professional 
relationships (Granovetter 1985). Although founders benefit from the social capital generated 
through their existing relationships, founders may receive higher quality contributions if the 
recruiting decision is made independent of their relationships.  
 
CHAPTER 4: OPEN FOR BUSINESS - FOUNDING PROCESSES AND 
ORGANIZING ACTIVITIES IN EMERGING ORGANIZATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 1999, John Kim met with two colleagues for dinner to discuss the 
possibility of starting a new business (Morse and Lim 2006). As a ten year veteran of IBM 
Korea and KPMG, Kim perceived an opportunity to develop a web-based “back office” 
software solutions targeted at the business to business market in South Korea. Kim and his 
colleagues spent the rest of 1999 exploring this potential business concept. By February of 
2000, they filed the necessary papers with the Korean National Tax Service in order to 
register NeoGenius as a legally recognized entity. They also secured office space, purchased 
computer equipment, and drew from their personal savings to use as initial capital for 
NeoGenius. During the spring and summer of 2000, the founders of NeoGenius formed 
partnerships with other established software vendors, filed patents, and raised additional 
angel funding. In November of 2000, Kim and his start-up team launched NeoSite, 
NeoGenius’s flagship software product designed to automate back office operations for firms 
in the South Korean textile industry. 
From a process perspective, entrepreneurs execute multiple start-up decisions to 
guide their emerging organizations a series of developmental stages and transitions (Hannan 
and Freeman 1989; Reynolds and Miller 1992; Ruef 2005). As highlighted by the case of 
NeoGenius, founders attempt to mobilize sufficient resources, secure appropriate legal 
recognition, create awareness among potential customers, and negotiate favorable terms with 
suppliers in order to develop their entrepreneurial intentions into established, viable 
organizations. Because these start-up activities are highly interdependent, founders may not 
guide their emerging organizations on a linear developmental trajectory (Aldrich and Ruef 
2006; Weick 1979). Founders may delay certain activities or pursue multiple organizing 
pathways concurrently because of unexpected contingencies or limited resources (Baker, 
Miner, and Eesley 2003). Founders may also repeat organizing activities already once 
accomplished, such as making improvements to product designs, to generate multiple 
feedback loops during the founding process (Chiles, Meyer, and Hench 2004).  
In this chapter, I propose a multi-dimensional, process-based approach to studying 
emerging organizations. I draw on process methodologies to integrate multiple organizing 
events to provide a richer and more complex description of the emergence process (Van de 
Ven and Engleman 2004). By integrating multiple organizing events, I avoid focusing on a 
single discrete to mark organizational founding. From this perspective, I assume that 
organizations emerge as founders execute plans to complete their organizing activities. 
Within this framework of analyzing multiple organizing events, I can also make inferences 
about an implicit ordering of these events. I use this process-based approach to align my 
empirical analyses more closely with theories of organizational founding (Aldrich and Ruef 
2006).  
To define the concept of organizational emergence, I draw on statements used to 
define established organizations. As the youngest members in an organizational population, 
emergent organizations should exhibit many of the properties normally associated with their 
older organizational counterparts. Definitions of organizations may vary in theoretical 
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emphasis, but they share a set of common elements. Organizations are goal-oriented, 
bounded entities, and participate in exchange activities across organizational boundaries with 
their environment (Aldrich 2006; Pfeffer 1997; Scott 1992). I treat emergence and its three 
dimensions as latent variables to form a measurement model based on multiple observable 
founding events. As a continuous measure, the level of organizational emergence depends on 
the extent to which founders progress through developmental stages and complete various 
organizing activities. 
My approach addresses two empirical challenges. First, researchers have not agreed 
on standard indicators to mark organizational founding. Based on their theoretical 
perspectives, researchers recognize emergent organizations differently. For example, 
institutional theorists may emphasize adherence to regulatory frameworks, such as filing 
incorporation papers or obtaining business licenses to operate (Scott 2001), whereas resource 
dependence theorists may stress marketing actions, such as meeting with prospective clients 
to establish the visibility of the new venture (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Resource-based 
theorists may focus on the generation of core routines, such as unique capabilities to generate 
competitive advantages (Barney 1991; Nelson and Winter 1982). In contrast, organizational 
ecology theorists may utilize population-specific events, such as the commencement of 
production to indicate establishment to other members in their organizational environments 
(Hannan and Freeman 1989).  
Second, researchers often define firm founding based on a single event for empirical 
convenience (Ruef 2005). To observe detailed organizing activities, researchers require 
appropriate empirical strategies to identify emerging firms early enough in their founding 
process. Researchers are also faced with the difficulties of collecting information on short-
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lived attempts when approximately 50 percent of founding attempts fail to progress beyond 
initial organizing efforts (Aldrich and Ruef 2006; Reynolds and White 1997). Furthermore, 
after identifying the entire risk set of emerging organizations, researchers must employ 
resource-intensive data collection procedures to collect information on multiple start-up 
activities.  
To avoid these empirical difficulties, researchers turn to archival data sources as a 
more convenient alternative strategy. Because archival sources typically contain limited 
founding information, researchers must assume that firm founding occurs with a single event. 
Using this assumption, researchers can devote more attention to organizational dynamics that 
occur in later stages of the organizational lifecycle (Aldrich and Ruef 2006).  
In the following sections, I describe the importance of understanding the organizing 
stage within the larger context of the organizational founding process. Drawing on 
organizational theory, I develop the concept of organizational emergence and its three 
dimensions. I test this model of emergence using the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial 
Dynamics (PSED), a nationally representative sample of nascent entrepreneurs actively 
starting new businesses in the United States. After discussing results from this analysis, I 
conclude with the implications of using an emergence framework in organizational studies. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FOUNDING AS A MULTI-STAGE PROCESS 
To place this study within its proper context, I begin by outlining a process model of 
organizational founding. This model is based on the assumption that new organizations 
emerge and this emergence is characterized by a series of developmental transitions (Aldrich 
and Ruef 2006; Reynolds and Miller 1992). The first transition in the process model occurs 
when individuals consider a transition into entrepreneurship. This decision may result from 
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deliberate planning or can occur serendipitously (Baker et al. 2003). If the decision leads 
individuals to undertake specific steps to start a business, they become nascent entrepreneurs 
(Reynolds 1994). As nascent entrepreneurs, they are focused on transforming their 
entrepreneurial intentions into viable new ventures. Founders encounter organizing 
challenges such as mobilizing resources and developing their product or service offerings. 
The second transition in the process model occurs if and when founders successfully 
organize their new ventures. At this transition, new firms emerge as established entities and 
face internal and external issues of growth and survival. I now turn to a more comprehensive 
account of the organizational founding process. 
The founding process begins when individuals make their decisions to start new 
businesses. Individuals evaluate several factors, such as financial resources and liquidity 
events (Stuart and Sorenson 2003), work experience (Brüderl et al. 1992), and abilities to 
uncover business opportunities (Shane 2003) as they consider this transition. Individual may 
also be influenced by their family backgrounds (Aldrich et al. 1998; Sørensen 2004), career 
trajectories (Carroll and Mosakowski 1987; Dobrev and Barnett 2005), and where they plan 
to locate their new businesses (Sørensen and Sorenson 2003). Prior to making the transition 
to entrepreneurship, individuals may seek start-up resources, acquire necessary skills, and 
build their social networks to increase the likelihood for establishing successful new firms. In 
these situations, individuals identify opportunities and then proceed to organizing their new 
ventures (Shane 2003). 
Some individuals may decide to start a new business without intentional planning. 
While those who follow a design prior to execution (DPE) model identify a particular 
business opportunity prior to entrepreneurial entry, founders who encounter unplanned 
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business opportunities may lead to improvisational foundings (Baker et al. 2003). In these 
situations, entrepreneurs transition to entrepreneurship as a response to unexpected 
opportunities, such as existing clients offering guaranteed work and seed money to launch a 
new venture. Because some organizing actions may actually precede the decision to start a 
new business, founders involved in improvisational foundings may blur distinctions in the 
founding process.  
After making the initial decision to start a new business, founders proceed to 
organizing their new ventures with the goal of forming established and independently 
organized entities. During this period, founders face challenges of accomplishing various 
start-up activities required to create operating organizations. In one study by Carter, Gartner, 
and Reynolds (1996), using a sample of 71 nascent entrepreneurs drawn from two larger 
representative samples, founders who reported running an operating business accomplished 
more activities than individuals who abandoned their start-up efforts. The founders who 
reported operating businesses engaged in resource mobilization activities, such as securing 
financing, purchasing supplies and equipment. In addition to generating revenues, founders 
also developed an infrastructure in their operating businesses through legal incorporation and 
start-up team recruitment.  
During this organizing period, founders promote their emerging organizations to 
others. Founders who engage in legitimacy-enhancing activities, such as obtaining 
accreditations, securing endorsements, and attracting favorable press reviews can develop 
entrepreneurial stories about their new ventures (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001). For example, 
Rao (1994) chronicled how automobile manufacturers between 1895 and 1912 earned 
credibility and enhanced their reputations by competing and winning various certification 
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contests. Founders can use these citations to build recognition and communicate with other 
prospective stakeholders. Founders who complete a formal business plan can offer this 
document as a tool to communicate product concepts, management team backgrounds, and 
financial projections when meeting with prospective financiers and customers 
(Castrogiovanni 1996).  
As they organize their new ventures, founders also develop strategies with an eye 
towards survival if their firms commence operations. Initially, because of coercive, mimetic, 
and normative isomorphic pressures, founders will likely craft entrepreneurial strategies that 
resemble those of other established organizations within their populations (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). Pressured by constraints imposed by governing bodies, founders in highly 
regulated industries respond by following proven strategies executed by established 
organizations. Because most new businesses reproduce existing organizational forms and 
operational procedures, founders imitate strategies implemented by successful prior 
foundings and learn from prior disbandings (Aldrich and Ruef 2006). Founders may draw on 
their work experience in similar industries and follow established professional standards in 
their new ventures. Founders of new ventures with radical innovations resulting in new 
organizational forms and entering new populations cannot rely on these established strategies 
and face the added difficulty of developing effective strategies of survival and growth. 
After emerging into established organizations, new firms continue to face internal and 
external issues of growth and survival. New firms struggle to secure resources within their 
populations as selection pressures continue to buffet these newly established organizations 
(Stinchcombe 1965). According to density-dependence theories, firms disband at much 
higher rates in new populations due to lack of legitimacy, while new organizations entering 
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dense populations disband more frequently due to intense competition (Hannan and Carroll 
1992). Disruptive events such as management changes in the founding team, shifts in 
regulatory oversight, or the introduction of competence-destroying innovations by competing 
organizations may affect the disbanding rate and growth of these new organizations 
(Anderson and Tushman 1990; Mezias and Boyle 2005; Wasserman 2003).  
In the following section, I focus specifically on the period when founders organize 
their new ventures and propose a framework for organizational emergence. In this process 
model, I provide an alternative approach to examining the development of start-up efforts 
into newly created firms based on the organizing activities founders undertake. 
DEFINING A FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANIZATIONAL EMERGENCE  
New organizations are established when their founders complete their organizing 
activities and commence full operations. Researchers use two general approaches to identify 
this transition. First, in survival analyses of established organizations, organizational scholars 
have relied on a single event to indicate when organizations enter the risk set. With practical 
empirical considerations in mind, researchers often use archival data sources and must rely 
on key organizing events that are available in their datasets to guide their selection of an 
appropriate founding event (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Founding events often differ among 
organizational forms, such as the commencement of production for automobile 
manufacturers (Carroll and Hannan 2000) and legal registrations for day care centers (Baum 
and Oliver 1992). Similarly, management researchers focused on organizational growth 
identify new firms in general terms and often rely on their data sources for founding 
definitions. For example, Bamford, Dean, and Douglas (2004) reviewed sampling frames in 
studies spanning over two decades of research and found a significant number of studies that 
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used samples of firms based on arbitrarily assigned periods of time (e.g., “less than five years 
old”).  
As a second approach to defining time of organizational founding, entrepreneurship 
researchers have used founders’ perceptions to mark when new firms become operational. 
For example, Carter et al. (1996) asked nascent entrepreneurs if their businesses were 
operating, if they were actively organizing, or abandoned their start-up efforts. In their 
examination of the relationship between business plans and successful start-up attempts, 
Honig and Karlsson (2004) used a self-reported indicator of operating status to measure if a 
new firm was successfully founded. Researchers who mark organizational founding with this 
method are dependent upon their respondents using a common definition of organizational 
establishment to self-report their founding status. Without this definition, researchers would 
require supplementary information about how founders defined organizational founding to 
interpret their self-reported status. Researchers would also encounter biases when confident 
entrepreneurs overestimate progress and less confident founders underestimate their 
achievements (Forbes 2005).   
 As an alternative approach to the two strategies I described, I propose using an 
emergence framework to mark the transition between organizing and operating stages. An 
emergence framework integrates multiple events, tracks the multi-dimensional nature of the 
organizing process, and accommodates non-linear organizing pathways. By relying on 
multiple events, the emergence approach limits selection biases that result from using 
samples of young firms based on arbitrarily designated founding events. This general 
framework applies across industries to avoid relying on founders’ perception and other 
socially constructed conceptions of organizational founding.  
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I define organizational emergence as a process in which nascent firms reflect 
characteristics of established organizations. The concept of organizational emergence has 
three dimensions: goal orientation, boundedness, and inter-organizational exchange (Aldrich 
2006; Pfeffer 1997; Scott 1992). From this perspective, new organizations that fully emerge 
exhibit characteristics in each dimension. Goal orientation refers to the development of 
organizations’ intended purpose and defining target outcomes (Aldrich 2006). Newly 
operating organizations show evidence of having goal orientation principally through 
development of concepts into a viable product or service; creation of an organizational 
identity and education of external stakeholders through external marketing; and establishing 
priorities for mobilizing resources through awareness of their financial needs. These actions 
increase emerging firms’ autonomy and enable them to pursue their visions in a self-directed 
manner (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). 
Boundedness reflects the degree to which emerging organizations distinguish 
themselves from other organizations within their environment. Aldrich (2006) emphasized 
boundary maintenance activities that founders must accomplish to allow new firms to stand 
on their own, apart from their founders. Organizational boundaries can emerge through 
intentional actions undertaken by founders as well as fulfilling requirements set by the 
organizations’ environment. Intentional actions may involve separation of resources and 
liability between founders and their emerging organizations. Founders can create access to 
their emerging organizations for other actors in the organizations’ environment such as 
potential creditors, suppliers, and customers. Responding to legal requirements established 
by the state also enables emerging organizations to gain their own identity. Firm registration 
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processes vary regionally, allowing entrepreneurs to establish organizational boundaries 
more easily in countries with minimal requirements (Djankov et al. 2002). 
Inter-organizational exchange captures the extent to which organizations have 
developed routines to engage other organizational actors within their environment (Scott 
1992). Because most organizations require external resources to accomplish their goals, 
organizations initially depend on other actors in their environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). Activities associated with this dimension of organizational emergence involve 
transactions of resource inputs and product outputs with other actors in the organizational 
environment. Beginning with few founding members, emerging organizations resemble bona 
fide groups (Putnam and Stohl 1990). Bone fide groups stand out for their dependence on 
their immediate environmental context through stable, but permeable boundaries.  
Because emerging organizations are highly dependent on their surroundings, founders 
initially rely on their personal social networks to develop transactional relationships with 
other organizational actors (Aldrich and Ruef 2006). Entrepreneurs may attempt to expand 
their network reach by seeking endorsements and introductions. For emerging organizations 
that survive and become established, the initial informal network of relationships may evolve 
into the core of a future inter-organizational exchange network (Brass et al. 2004).  
In addition to its three dimensions, the organizational emergence framework has two 
additional features. First, the three dimensions of organizational emergence cannot be 
observed directly. I use continuous latent variables to measure these constructs and link them 
to observable activities associated with each dimension. Second, the concept does not rely on 
a single, discrete event that occurs at a given point in the organizing process. Instead, 
organizational emergence begins with the founders’ initial activity and spans the entire 
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organizing period. By defining these dimensions as continuous measures, I can describe 
organizational emergence as a process with a range of intermediate thresholds. In this process 
model, activity occurrences represent increasing organizational emergence. Because an 
emergence perspective to organizational founding relies on a process-based approach, time 
plays an important role in explanations based on this framework. In the following section, I 
describe the role of time during the emergent period of new firms.  
THE ROLE OF TIME IN THE ORGANIZING STAGE  
As they organize, founders make progress on their start-up efforts by conducting 
activities that lead to firm emergence. I explore how two temporal characteristics – length of 
organizing time and sequential properties of organizing activities – may affect founding 
outcomes.  
Length of Organizing Time 
The time spent in organizing affects whether founders finish organizing their new 
ventures successfully. However, the mechanisms by which organizing time impacts the 
founding process remain unresolved. Hannan and Freeman (1989) offered three reasons for a 
negative relationship between organizing time and commencing operations. First, 
opportunity costs, such as foregone salary, increase as time spent on organizing increases. 
Second, competitive pressures may intensify as other entrepreneurs enter the same niche. 
Third, initial planning and forecasts may no longer hold as environmental conditions change, 
especially when founders organize over a significant period of time (Gartner and Carter 
2003).  
Ruef (2006) proposed the concept of entrepreneurial inertia to describe how longer 
organizing time may positively benefit founders. With additional time to plan, founders can 
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understand their competition more deeply. Founders can take advantage of their longer 
organizing period to enhance their ventures’ credibility and to secure sufficient resources for 
a more effective launch. In highly regulated industries, founders require lengthy lead times to 
prepare accurate applications for governing bodies and receive approvals from them to 
commence operations. Some founders may only work part-time on their new ventures until 
they generate sufficient revenues to warrant further organizing. In these situations, founders 
can explore the viability of a concept initially without investing significant resources. For 
concepts that appear promising, founders may direct more resources to develop these 
opportunities into viable organizations. 
Empirical tests of the relationship between organizing time and founding outcomes 
have produced mixed results, partly due to industry specific characteristics of the founding 
process. While Ruef (2006) showed evidence of entrepreneurial inertia in foundings of U.S. 
medical schools, Carroll and Hannan (2000) found that U.S. automobile manufacturers 
followed a non-monotonic trajectory as they organized. For these manufacturers, the rate of 
transition from preproduction to production stages was low for short preproduction periods 
(less than six months), then increased until preproduction periods reached six years, and then 
subsequently decreased. Mode of entry may also influence the relationship between 
organizing time and founding outcomes. In Ruef’s (2005) longitudinal study of MBA alumni 
entrepreneurs, individuals who started firms independently (de novo) make the transition 
more quickly than individuals who organize new firms that spin-off from parent 
organizations. As one explanation, in existing organizations, individuals face structural 
inertia from their existing roles that hinder the ability to create roles associated with new 
ventures (Hannan and Freeman 1989).  
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Sequential Properties of Organizing Activities 
In addition to how long founders organize, the time between organizing activities 
may also impact founding outcomes. Researchers can examine whether execution of 
organizing activities exhibits properties of sequential ordering. Through inductive 
examinations, researchers can identify global sequence types of organizing activity 
occurrence. Clustering algorithms generate sequence types based on user-supplied 
assumptions (e.g., Abbott’s (1990) Optimal Matching technique). Researchers can code these 
sequence types for subsequent analyses or compare deductively with theoretically derived 
ideal-types (Pentland 2003). Other possible sequential properties include the pacing of 
activities (i.e., time during or between activities), frequency of each activity (if repeatable), 
or frequency of activities classified into categories.  
Activity mapping may also reveal evidence of perfect concurrence (when activities 
occur at the same time) or lagged concurrence (when an activity begins prior to the 
conclusions of a prior event) (Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow 2001). For example, founders 
may undertake four organizing activities spanning multiple sub-processes simultaneously. 
Based on an inductive approach, several interpretations exist for this scenario. A basic linear 
interpretation suggests that the preceding and subsequent events treat the simultaneous 
activity occurrence as one step in a unitary sequence. By relaxing the linear sequencing 
assumption, an alternative explanation suggests that up to four pathways may converge at or 
emerge from the simultaneous event occurrence. Without explicit theoretical propositions to 
generate rules to resolve simultaneous events, inductive examinations limit the derivation of 
a comprehensive sequential explanation.  
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In addition to mapping activities to time directly, Poole et al. (2000) suggested 
examining specific subsequences of events and their interactions with external outcomes. 
Rather than analyzing an exhaustive inventory of activities for sequential properties, 
researchers could select activities based on their theoretical importance. Analyses focus on 
whether accomplishing certain activities predict future completion of additional activities. 
Longitudinal analytical techniques integrate temporal distances and determine sequential 
relationships among organizing activities and between activities and founding outcomes. 
With the availability of more detailed observations on organizing activities, researchers have 
reported the impact of specific activities on certain founding events. For example, analyzing 
a sample of Swedish nascent entrepreneurs, Delmar and Shane (2004) described how 
legitimating activities such as completing a business plan and establishing a legal entity led 
to execution of additional organizing activities in product development, marketing, and 
obtaining raw materials and supplies. Using Hannan and Freeman’s (1989) sub-process 
categories, Ruef (2005) noted a sequential ordering of these ideal-type categories, based on a 
sample of MBA alumni nascent entrepreneurs.  
I extend Poole et al.’s (2000) approach to examining sequential properties by 
assuming that activity occurrence indicates increasing organizational emergence. I derive 
sequencing properties by observing the extent to which organizing activities are 
accomplished at different levels of emergence. Rather than inferring temporal ordering based 
on a causal relationship (e.g., activity x leads to activity y), I infer sequential properties by 
comparing the probability of activities occurring at a given level of emergence. Higher 
probabilities of activity occurrence suggest earlier temporal ordering. Using this approach, I 
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also avoid complications related to classifying non-linear activity progression such as 
concurrent activity occurrences. 
In the following section, I test this process model of organizational emergence. The 
organizational emergence framework bridges population and intra-population aspects of the 
founding process. I contend that the dimensions of organizational emergence – goal 
orientation, boundedness, and inter-organizational exchange – apply across populations 
because generic definitions of organizations are used to define the concept. Testing for this 
consistency requires a sample of emerging organizations from diverse industries. At the same 
time, the organizational emergence framework can accommodate intra-population 
differences. I expect the influence of organizing time and presence of sequencing properties 
to differ across industries, due to unique characteristics that distinguish organizational forms. 
Population-level explanations such as density-dependence arguments may provide insights 
into understanding these sequencing properties. I now turn to a description of my analytical 
approach and report results for testing the process model on emerging organizations.  
DATA AND METHODS 
I analyzed data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), a 
nationally representative sample of nascent entrepreneurs in the United States actively 
starting new businesses. To form the sample, a two-stage design was used. In the first stage, 
59,575 adults, aged 18 years and older, residing within the contiguous 48 states of the United 
States, were selected between July, 1998 and January, 2000 using random digit dialing 
(RDD) methodology. These individuals completed a screening interview which contained 
four qualifying questions. Individuals qualified as nascent entrepreneurs if they expected to 
be majority owners of new businesses they had been actively trying to start within the last 12 
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months. Owners reporting firms with positive cash flow for at least three months or majority 
institutional ownership did not qualify. This initial screening interview resulted in a pool of 
1,164 eligible individuals who could be located. From this pool, individuals were randomly 
drawn and invited to participate in the full study. In this second stage, 830 individuals, which 
included women and minority over-samples, completed the full survey, for a response rate of 
71 percent.  Respondents reported information on their new ventures, team members and 
members of their external support networks. The University of Michigan’s Institute for 
Social Research oversaw the final data collection efforts. A complete description of the 
study’s background, sampling methodology, and response rates can be found in Gartner et al. 
(2004b).  
Due to various reasons, I dropped 23 cases from the final sample. Fourteen cases of 
the 23 cases were dropped due to lack of majority ownership by nascent entrepreneur(s) 
(seven cases), maturity of the new business based on three months of positive cash flow (six 
cases), or missing team data (one case) (Ruef et al. 2003). After reviewing start-up activity 
information, I dropped an additional nine cases based on four reasons: misinterpretation of 
questions (two cases), no reported start-up activity (three cases), and start-up too advanced 
based on timing of accomplished activities (four cases). In my analyses, I used an effective 
sample of 807 cases. 
I utilized individual case weights calculated by the Institute for Survey Research at 
the University of Michigan for the PSED. These weights accounted for differences in 
selection probabilities based on age, education, race, and sex (based on the Current 
Population Surveys conducted by the U.S. Census) and corrected for differences due to 
differential non-response rates (Curtin and Reynolds 2004). 
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Organizing Activity Variables 
To construct my measurement model, I focused on nine organizing activities: 
developed product/service; started marketing of product/service; created financial 
projections; filed Federal income tax return; opened bank account; established supplier 
credit; generated revenues from sale of goods/services; purchased/leased/rented 
equipment/facilities/property; and purchased raw materials/inventory/supplies/components. I 
identified these nine activities based on exploratory analyses of theoretical linkages with the 
dimensions of organizational emergence2. For these data, I created a dichotomous variable 
for each activity (1=activity took place). In the initial interview, respondents reported if the 
activity occurred. In subsequent waves, respondents were asked the same question only if the 
start-up activity was not reported to take place in a previous interview.  
I encountered three situations which contributed to missing data for these nine 
indicators. In addition to sample attrition and item non-response, a third source of missing 
data resulted from survey design issues. In the interim follow-up interviews, only a portion of 
the sample was asked the start-up activity questions. At the beginning of these interviews, 
respondents provided a self-assessment on the status of their new ventures using a four 
category response. Respondents who indicated having 1) an operating business or 2) who 
classified themselves as actively trying answered the start-up activity questions. The 
remaining respondents who reported 3) quitting the new venture or 4) classified themselves 
inactive were not asked the start-up activity questions. In the final wave, this screening 
question no longer applied so that all respondents, regardless of their status self-assessment 
                                                 
2
 In the PSED, respondents provided information on 25 organizing activities. The remaining 16 activities were 
not used due to their lack of theoretical linkages or poor model fit. 
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were allowed to respond to start-up activity questions. Based on listwise deletion, only 515 
complete cases were available (approximately 65 percent of the sample).  
Complete case analysis potentially produces biased results due to its assumption of 
Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) (Little and Rubin 1987). Additionally, because 
many of the dropped cases have missing data for a subset of the variables, valuable 
information would be lost in complete case analysis. Multiple imputation provides an 
alternative approach to handling missing data and requires less stringent assumptions of the 
data (missing at random (MAR) conditions). I used the Multiple Imputation by Chained 
Equations (MICE) algorithm written for STATA by Royston (2005), based on methods 
outlined by Little and Rubin (1987), Schafer (1997), and van Buuren (1999). I created five 
imputed data sets from which I tested the following models (Allison 2001). 
[INSERT FIGURE 4.1 HERE] 
Path Diagram 
In Figure 4.1, I diagram the relationships between three first order latent variables – 
goal orientation, boundedness, and inter-organizational exchange – with nine observed 
indicators, along with the associated disturbance terms. I include a second order latent 
variable – organizational emergence – that influences the three first order latent variables. In 
Table 4.1, I provide descriptive statistics for the latent variables and their observed 
indicators. Occurrence of these nine activities at the final interview ranged from 68 percent 
(filed Federal income taxes) to 92 percent (purchased raw materials, inventory, supplies, and 
components). 
[INSERT TABLE 4.1 HERE] 
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Influence of Organizing Time 
 
 The sampling frame of the PSED focused on nascent entrepreneurs who have been 
actively starting a new business within the last twelve months. Because qualifying for the 
sample only required some recent activity, some nascent entrepreneurs have organized for 
longer than 12 months. To assess the impact of organizing time, I included an exogenous 
variable to create a MIMIC model. I tested the impact of time as a direct effect on the three 
first-order latent variables. Testing the direct effects allows me to examine how organizing 
time affects each dimension of emergence. To calculate organizing time, I determined the 
earliest reported start-up activity date and computed the number of months from this date and 
the date of the first interview. The earliest reported activity date was based on 25 start-up 
activity variables. (See  Appendix A for details.) The average organizing time was 43.3 
months and ranged from 0.36 to 472.21 months. Due to the highly skewed distribution of 
organizing time, I used its natural logarithm. 
Equations 
 The measurement model represented in the general equation, y = Λy η + ε, does not 
hold because the categorical variables in y are not normally distributed (Bollen 1989). In 
order to correct this violation, I replace y with y*, a vector of continuous latent variables that 
are not directly observed, but rather underlie the observed categorical indicators (y). 
Therefore, the general model tested is based on the following equations: 
y* = Λy η + ε  (1) 
η = Bη + Γx1 + ζ (2) 
x = ξ   (3) 
To link y with y*, an auxiliary measurement model is used.   
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In equation (1), y* represents a vector of 9 unobserved continuous latent variables of 
organizing activities. The variables in y* correspond to y, a vector of 9 observed 
dichotomous indicators. Λy is a vector of factor loadings associated with the 9 indicators. η is 
a vector of three first-order factors: goal orientation (η1), boundedness (η2), and inter-
organizational exchange (η3). To distinguish the factor loadings and their corresponding 
factor associations, I use the following subscript notation: λij, where i is the number of the 
observed indicator (yi) and j refers to the influencing factor (ηj). I assigned a value of 1 to λ11, 
λ42, and λ73 in order to scale the latent variables η1, η2, and η3. The measurement disturbance 
term, ε, is associated with each variable in y*. In equation (2), η4 represents the second-order 
factor (organizational emergence), B is a vector of factor loadings on the three first-order 
factors (η), and ζ are disturbance terms associated with each first-order factor. x1 represents 
organizing time and is a perfect measure of ξ (equation 3). Γ is a vector of coefficients for x1 
on the three first-order factors (η). I assigned a value of 1 to β1 in order to scale the latent 
variables η4.   
Estimation 
 To estimate this MIMIC model, I used diagonally weighted least squares approach 
(DWLS). DWLS distributional requirements are not as stringent as MLE. Maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) techniques require observed variables to have a multi-normal 
distribution (Bollen 1989). However, with categorical variables, these assumptions are 
violated due to the non-continuous nature of the variables. The covariance matrix of y* does 
not equal the covariance matrix of the y. In order to estimate the covariance matrix of y*, I 
 86 
calculated tetrachoric correlations, because all observed indicators were dichotomous. 
Additionally, using a relatively large sample, I did not face issues associated with small 
samples when using DWLS.  I utilized Mplus v.3, which relies on diagonally weighted least-
squares with mean and variance-adjusted chi-square estimation procedures to estimate 
categorical endogenous latent variables. I identified the model using the MIMIC and three-
indicator rules (Bollen 1989).   
[INSERT TABLE 4.2 HERE] 
RESULTS  
Model Fit and Evaluation 
 I assessed overall model fit by evaluating five fit statistics: mean correlation 
residuals, Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA), and model chi-square. In Table 4.2 (Model 1), I report values 
of these fit measures for the overall model by averaging values across the five imputed 
datasets. These statistics indicated a fairly good fitting model. The mean value of the 
correlation residuals was -0.01, with values close to zero indicating good model fit. The 
values for the CFI, TLI, and (1-RMSEA) statistics were at or above 0.95, a generally 
accepted threshold for good model fit. However, the statistically significant model chi-square 
statistic indicated a poorly fitting model. Because the other four model fit statistics indicated 
good model fit, I attribute the statistically significant model chi-square to excessive statistical 
power from the relatively large sample (n=807). The chi-square test statistic may have 
detected small departures in the implied covariance matrix from the population covariance 
matrix.  
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Industry Similarity - Multiple Group Analysis 
 To assess model fit across industrial sectors, I conducted a multiple group analysis by 
first assigning each case to one of four categories – primary/manufacturing/transportation, 
retail/wholesale, consumer/support services, or professional services – based on the 1997 
NAICS coding scheme. I allowed factor loadings and thresholds to estimate freely across all 
four groups to test measurement form invariance. The models for all four industrial sectors fit 
well, suggesting form invariance across these groups based on the overall model. I report fit 
statistics for the multiple group analysis in Table 4.2 (Model 2). Mean correlation residuals 
ranged from -0.01 to -0.02. CFI, TLI, and 1-RMSEA values were at or above 0.95. Again, I 
attribute the statistically significant model chi-square to excessive power.  
Testing measurement form invariance across all four categories required that all nine 
start-up activities were theoretically appropriate within each industrial sector. To test whether 
certain activities were affected by population level characteristics, I tested an alternative 
model. I allowed one indicator in each of the three dimensions - y3 (created financial 
projections), y6 (established supplier credit), and y9 (purchased raw materials, inventory, 
supplies, components) – to vary in form across all four categories. The level of importance 
placed on these three activities can differ across populations, whereas the remaining six 
activities have generic qualities that apply across populations. For example, founders in 
resource intensive industrial sector, such as manufacturing, may view these three organizing 
activities differently than founders who start service-related businesses that require minimal 
initial resources. For this revised analysis, model fit statistics remained similar to the original 
multiple group analysis (results not shown). Based on these results, within each industrial 
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sector, I conclude that emerging organizations exhibit goal orientation, boundedness, and 
inter-organizational exchange characteristics.  
[INSERT TABLE 4.3 HERE] 
Component Fit and Substantive Findings 
In Table 4.3, I present model coefficients and their R2 values in columns 1 – 7 for the 
overall model. In terms of component fit, I reviewed the direction of coefficient estimates for 
Λy and the squared multiple correlation coefficients (R2) for each indicator. Directionally, 
each coefficient estimate appeared reasonable. The R2 values indicated that the observed 
indicators provided sufficient explained variance of the underlying latent variables. All R2 
values were near 0.50 or greater. Furthermore, there were no negative R2 values or estimated 
correlations between two variables greater than one. I encountered a negative residual 
variance for the goal-oriented latent factor in four situations (overall model, 
primary/manufacturing/transportation, consumer/support services, and professional services 
industrial sectors). These values were close to zero and not statistically significant. I 
attributed these results to sampling fluctuation (Bollen 1989).  
To assess sequential properties based on the extent to which certain start-up activities 
have occurred in emerging organizations, I transformed factor loadings into predicted 
probabilities. Because an auxiliary measurement model was used to link y and y*, the 
transformation provided a substantive interpretation of the impact of the latent variable (η4 – 
organizational emergence) on y. For specified values of η4, I calculated predicted 
probabilities from the factor loadings based on the following formula:  
Pr(yj=1|η4) = F[-(τ-λη4)/sqrt(θ)]  (3) 
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where τ is the threshold value for yj, λ is the factor loading for yj, η4 is the value of 
organizational emergence, and θ is the residual variance of yj (Muthén and Asparouhov 
2002). Because the model contained a second-order factor, I accounted for indirect effects of 
the second-order factor (B) by multiplying these coefficients with their respective factor 
loadings. I use this value (βj*λj) (shown in Table 4.3, column 4) for the factor loading term 
(λj) in equation 3. The predicted probability is the standard normal cumulative distribution of 
calculated in equation 3, which is shown in Table 4.3, columns 8, 9, and 10. I used three 
values of organizational emergence based on its standard deviation (-σ, 0, and σ) in the 
probability calculations and to calculate a range of probabilities for activity occurrence. The 
standard deviation (σ) was 0.79 for the organizational emergence latent factor. I also 
calculated marginal effects for each activity to explore the range of probability change.  In 
columns 12 and 13, I show the actual and percent changes in the predicted probabilities 
between one standard deviation above and below the mean (henceforth: -σ to +σ).  
 Based on the overall model (Table 4.3), I observed a pattern of organizing activities 
among the three dimensions of organizational emergence. New ventures started with goal 
orientation activities (48 to 81 percent change) and proceeded to inter-organizational 
exchange activities (67 to 240 percent change) and boundary forming activities (154 to 1,130 
percent). When the value of organizational emergence was set to one standard deviation 
below its mean, the predicted probabilities were greater than 0.50 for three goal orientation 
activities and one inter-organizational exchange activity. Although these results suggested a 
general organizing sequence, industry level analyses provided a more comprehensive account 
of these sequencing properties.   
[INSERT TABLE 4.4 HERE] 
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[INSERT FIGURE 4.2 HERE] 
 The results from the industry level analyses revealed four types of sequencing 
properties corresponding to each industrial sector. In Table 4.4, for each sector, I summarized 
the changes in predicted probabilities between -σ to +σ. Smaller changes in predicted 
probabilities indicated earlier occurrence of these activities in the organizing process. In 
Figure 4.2, I graphed the predicted probabilities for each industrial sector to show the 
likelihood of activity occurrence during early organizational emergence (three standard 
deviations below the mean to the mean value of organizational emergence). To improve the 
clarity of the graphs, I displayed only selected probability curves. 
Emerging firms in primary, manufacturing, and transportation sectors followed a 
marketing and mobilization prior to sales (MMPS) process. Founders in these ventures began 
marketing their products and services very early in their organizing stage. In Figure 4.2a, the 
predicted probability curve for the marketing activity is the left-most curve, indicating a high 
probability of occurrence at low levels of emergence. The predicted probability for marketing 
to occur at three standard deviations below the mean was 0.58, which was the highest value 
for any activity across all four industries at this level of emergence. Several resource 
mobilization activities followed, such as establishing supplier credit, calculating financial 
projections, assembling supplies, and securing property and equipment. For these four 
activities, the changes in predicted probabilities from -σ to +σ were low (0.51 or lower). I 
offer one explanation for the sequence of these resource mobilization activities based on 
Figure 4.2a. Initially, the predicted probability curve for materials purchases remained above 
the supplier credit curve (until -2σ below the mean value of emergence). During this period 
of emergence, founders acquired their initial allotment of raw materials and supplies using 
 91 
personal resources. Through initial marketing efforts, founders attained some legitimacy with 
their suppliers who provided credit to the new business for additional purchases. At two 
standard deviations below the mean level of emergence, the curves for materials purchases 
and supplier credit intersected. With the higher likelihood of supplier credit availability, 
founders began to acquire property and equipment.  
When compared to the other three sectors, revenue generation occurred latest in the 
emergence process for the primary, manufacturing, and transportation sectors. Although 
initial sales took place relatively late, the likelihood for founders to generate their initial 
revenues happened within a short period of emergence. The predicted probability for this 
activity increased from 0.10 (at one standard deviation below the mean) to 0.91 (at the mean 
value of organizational emergence). The delay in initial sales may result from significant lead 
times necessary to create and sell capital intensive products. Receiving regulatory approvals 
may also increase the time between initial organizing activity and generating sales. However, 
once the developed products obtain their approvals, initial sales occur shortly afterwards. 
New ventures in professional services followed a planning and development prior to 
sales (PDPS) process (Figure 4.2b). In this sector, activities such as creating financial 
projections, developing and marketing the service, and securing supplies occurred early in 
the organizing stage. The changes in predicted probabilities from -σ to +σ ranged from 0.32 
to 0.50 for these activities and were among the smallest of the nine activities, indicating their 
early occurrence in the emergence process. Purchasing, leasing, or renting 
equipment/property occurred with initial sales late in the emergence process. Starting a 
professional services business may require low initial overhead, such as conducting 
operations within the founders’ homes. However, as emerging firms generate sales, founders 
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may open an office or secure additional equipment. Change in predicted probabilities from -σ 
to +σ was 0.75 for securing equipment/property and 0.81 for generating initial sales. In 
general, the activities in the professional services sector occurred gradually, represented by 
the flatter predicted probability curves. 
Retail/wholesale ventures exhibited a compressed activity sequence (Figure 4.2c). 
Seven of the nine organizing activities occurred early in this sector, with changes in predicted 
probabilities from -σ to +σ οf less than 0.50. The small changes in probabilities indicate an 
accelerated pace in emergence for retail/wholesale ventures. At -σ, the predicted probabilities 
for the seven activities were greater than 0.50. I display five of the seven activities in Figure 
2c (product development, property acquisition, inventory acquisition, generating sales, and 
establishing supplier credit). Initial sales occurred the earliest, compared to the other three 
sectors.  
In contrast to the rapid pace of retail/wholesale ventures, consumer/support services 
ventures displayed an extended organizing sequence and emerged at a much slower pace 
(Figure 4.2d). Changes in predicted probabilities were greater than 0.60 in eight of the nine 
activities. Founders in consumer/support services ventures projected financials early but took 
more time to organize. After some initial planning, these founders may have proceeded 
informally by slowly formalizing their concepts. Although not shown, five additional 
activities occurred nearly at the same probabilities with the three activities (securing supplies, 
generating sales, and acquiring credit) shown in Figure 4.2d. Given the longer timeframe, 
founders of these ventures delayed committing full-time to their new ventures. For example, 
a nascent entrepreneur could be working full-time while starting a business during the 
evenings or on weekends. Among the four industrial sectors, founders secured raw materials 
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and other supplies the latest. The change in predicted probabilities (0.66) was highest among 
the four sectors. This may indicate evidence of entrepreneurial bricolage, as resource 
constrained founders “make do” with existing resources to build their businesses (Baker and 
Nelson 2005). 
I found partial support for a relationship between organizing time and emergence. 
New venture age had a statistically significant positive relationship on achieving only one 
dimension (inter-organizational exchange) in the overall model. The multiple group analysis 
revealed a statistically significant relationship in two situations. In consumer/support services 
ventures, organizing time had a positive relationship with achieving the inter-organizational 
exchange dimension (γ3 = 0.16). By combining these results with the sequencing explanation, 
founders in consumer/support services ventures may actually benefit from lengthy organizing 
timeframes. Entrepreneurial inertia may provide these nascent entrepreneurs opportunities to 
secure adequate resources or test their concepts sufficiently to increase their likelihood for 
creating a viable new firm (Ruef 2006). In retail/wholesale ventures, organizing time had a 
negative relationship with achieving the goal orientation dimension (γ1 = −0.18). Given the 
rapid organizing pace of retail/wholesale ventures, founders may not formally complete the 
planning and development activities associated with this dimension. In the remaining sectors, 
founders did not appear discouraged from continuing work on their start-up attempts over an 
extended period of time.  
DISCUSSION 
 In this paper, I proposed an emergence framework to explain how founders organize 
their new ventures within the context of the firm creation process. Based on properties of 
organizations developed by Aldrich (1979) and Katz and Gartner (1988), I described three 
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dimensions of organizational emergence: goal orientation, boundedness, and inter-
organizational exchange. I developed a measurement model that links latent characteristics of 
new organizations with nine organizing activities as observed indicators. With a multi-
dimensional approach to examining organizational founding, I provide an alternative to using 
single founding events or founders’ self-evaluation of organizing status to mark firm creation. 
The organizational emergence framework also provides a continuous measurement option for 
marking progress made by founders during the organizing stage. A continuous measure 
provides a richer, more nuanced understanding of start-up processes of emerging 
organizations over discrete event indicators. Discrete measures may provide empirical 
convenience in some situations (e.g., archival data). However, using discrete indicators can 
censor partially operating organizations that have not fully emerged. I also explored the role 
of two temporal characteristics, the length of organizing time and sequential properties of 
organizing activities. 
Using data from the PSED, I tested this process model of emergence. Three results 
stood out. First, the organizational emergence framework exhibited good model fit across 
four industrial sectors. Second, sequencing properties of organizing activities differed across 
industrial sectors. Manufacturing/transportation start-ups displayed evidence of early 
marketing and resource mobilization activities. Start-up attempts in professional services 
revealed early planning and development actions. Retail/wholesale ventures organized 
quickly, while consumer/support services ventures organized over a much longer timeframe. 
Third, organizing time partially affected organizational emergence in the retail/wholesale and 
consumer/support services sector. These results provide an empirical extension to Katz and 
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Gartner’s (1988) proposal for identifying and examining properties of emergent 
organizations. 
Given the limited support for a relationship between length of organizing time and 
emergence, researchers who study organizing processes using the PSED may not be 
hampered by left-truncation issues related to organizing time. Some have argued that the 
sampling strategy to identify nascent entrepreneurs employed in the PSED overlooked 
shorter organizing efforts (Gartner, Carter, and Reynolds 2004a). To address this concern, 
researchers could define an “organizing window” and exclude any organizing efforts that 
began outside of this window. For example, Delmar and Shane (2004) restricted their 
analyses to ventures that initiated their organizing activities within 24 months of the initial 
interview. Without conclusive results on the relationship between organizing time and 
emergence, researchers using an organizing window will lose valuable information (by 
dropping cases) and potentially define their organizing window arbitrarily.  
The organizational emergence framework does not explicitly integrate two commonly 
studied start-up processes: social organization and business planning. When conducting 
social organization activities, founders may recruit other collaborators by offering equity in 
the new business, hire initial employees, and take steps to establish a human resources 
infrastructure (Aldrich and Ruef 2006; Hannan and Freeman 1989). Although Ruef (2005) 
found evidence of social organization occurring prior to operational start-up, founders may 
only conduct these activities when starting certain types of businesses, such as capital 
intensive manufacturing start-ups that require significant labor. In the PSED, approximately 
1/3 of nascent firms hired an employee during the five year observation period and 85 
percent of new businesses had only one or two owners. For most newly operating firms, 
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social organization activities may either occur after organizations fully emerge or in the case 
of solo or two person ventures, may not apply at all. 
Scholars have debated the role and impact of business planning in the organizing 
process. Castrogiovanni (1996) suggested that business planning does not lead directly to 
founding outcomes, but instead, generates benefits such as creating a communication vehicle, 
developing organizational knowledge and identifying operational efficiencies. Honig and 
Karlsson (2004) argued that coercive and mimetic institutional pressures encourage nascent 
entrepreneurs to write business plans. Delmar and Shane (2003) reported that business 
planning positively affects the survival of new ventures. The organizational emergence 
framework does not explicitly include an indicator for completing a formal business plan, but 
relies on activities such as financial planning, product development, and market promotion 
activities that a formal planning exercise requires.  
I describe four limitations to this study and its findings. First, incorporating additional 
observed indicators of organizing activities may provide additional substantive insights. 
Although the nine activities used in the measurement model exhibited good model and 
component fit, integrating other organizing activities into the model may provide additional 
insights. Further testing within industrial groups may lead to more nuanced models 
incorporating industry specific activities (e.g., applying for patent protection in technology 
oriented businesses).  
Additionally, due to lack of measures in the PSED, the measurement model does not 
specifically integrate direct indicators of legitimacy and other institutional-related activities 
for the boundedness dimension. Depending on the regulatory setting of the nascent firms, 
using indicators such as legal incorporation and business licensing to measure firm 
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boundedness may lead to different conclusions on the sequencing of boundary creating 
activities. In certain regions of the United States, nascent entrepreneurs may operate as sole 
proprietors or in general partnerships without filing any incorporation papers with their local 
governing entities. Approximately 50 percent of nascent entrepreneurs in the PSED reported 
sole proprietor status, raising the importance of contextualizing the use of firm registration as 
a start-activity indicator. In their study of new businesses in Munich, Germany, Brüderl, 
Preisendörfer, and Ziegler (1992) pointed out nearly 20 percent of their original sample 
(created from firm registrations) were not intended to be active businesses, but were created 
to take advantage of local tax deductions. Djankov et al. (2002) described how firm 
registration processes differed substantially between regions in their study of 85 countries.  
Second, similar to other studies on organizing activities, I relied on organizing 
activity information based on their first occurrence (Delmar and Shane 2004; Lichtenstein et 
al. 2005; Ruef 2005). Measuring activities at first occurrence serves as a first approximation 
to alternative methods of mapping these organizing activities to time, such as frequency of 
and intervals between occurrences (Ancona et al. 2001). For recurrent organizing activities, 
using first occurrence may not capture the full extent of how emerging organizations achieve 
a threshold level of development within each dimension. Activities such as resource 
acquisition or generating sales may occur slowly in early stages of development but may 
intensify subsequently. Capturing such information would deepen the theoretical 
understanding of the emergence process, but require considerable additional data collection. 
Additionally, organizing time may have a different relationship with emergence because of 
the inclusion of repeated activity occurrences. Using first occurrence to mark recurrent 
activities also may lead to measurement error in some cases. For example, respondents who 
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initiated new ventures as improvisational foundings may have purchased equipment or 
supplies closely associated with their previous occupations. To address this concern, I 
reviewed the cases for any inconsistent responses to the occurrence of start-up activities. I 
described these steps in Appendix A. 
Third, I used industrial sectors based on two digit NAICS industrial codes. Although 
sequencing properties differed among the four industrial sectors, the broad industrial 
categories may have obscured unique features of specific populations within the sectors. 
Focused population-level studies may yield additional insights. For example, studying a 
sample of emerging organizations in one sector allows for a comparison of sequential 
properties among diverse organizational forms within the sector. In these focused studies, 
additional relationships between organizing time and emergence may emerge. 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Using an emergence framework to study the organizing stage makes two important 
contributions to organizational theory. First, by disaggregating the founding process into 
distinct stages, researchers can probe more closely at the transitions between stages and the 
factors that impact these transitions. From this perspective, analysis of emerging 
organizations connects multiple streams of research in entrepreneurship and macro-
organizational behavior. Researchers can improve the precision of how determinants of 
entrepreneurial entry contribute to mechanisms of completing the organizing stage and 
dynamics of organizational growth and survival. Using a structural modeling framework, 
researchers can examine the impact of exogenous factors (such as resource availability or 
environmental conditions) on transitions between multiple stages concurrently. In these 
models, organizational emergence would act as an intervening variable and impact 
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subsequent outcome measures such as new venture performance and survival. This approach 
also enables researchers to avoid selection biases that may lead to inaccurate conclusions if 
sampling designs do not account for all actors at risk for the transition outcomes (Aldrich 
1999). Because organizing time does not influence all emerging organizations, studies in 
certain industries that rely on pre-defined organizing timeframe should consider the impact of 
excluding attempts that have taken longer to organize.  
Second, the emergence framework spurs new interpretations of existing accounts of 
firm founding processes and complements existing research on other stages of the founding 
process (Chiles et al. 2004). Examining the activities that occur during the organizing stage 
provides opportunities to join macro-level theoretical propositions of organizational founding 
with micro-level foundations and processes (Hannan and Carroll 1992). For example, age-
dependency theories derived from Stinchcombe’s (1965) liabilities of newness thesis contain 
two opposing arguments (Carroll and Hannan 2000). Lack of resources, organizational 
knowledge, and legitimacy support a negative age-dependency argument, while imprinting 
and structural inertia provide an alternative positive age-dependency explanation. However, 
these existing explanations depend on a single founding event to mark firm establishment. 
When applying a multi-dimensional emergence framework, alternative explanations become 
apparent. The liability of adolescence explanation suggests that organizations encounter 
greater disbanding pressures after depleting initial resources (Brüderl and Schussler 1990; 
Fichman and Levinthal 1991). From an emergence perspective, the lower disbanding rate 
among younger organizations may highlight those attempts still progressing in the organizing 
stage. Once firms emerge completely out of the organizing stage, age-dependency reverses as 
operating firms encounter competitive pressures within their populations. The emergence 
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perspective provides opportunities to combine competing explanations for age-dependency 
across multiple stages in the founding process. 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I examined how Stinchcombe’s (1965) liabilities of newness 
argument applied to the emergence of new firms. During the period of organizational 
emergence, founders face the task of expanding their networks beyond their strong ties in 
order to acquire external entrepreneurial knowledge and other forms of support. I addressed 
two research questions – the role of founders’ support networks and founders’ ability to 
acquire external knowledge – based on Stinchcombe’s argument. I also pursued a third 
research question – developing a multi-dimensional approach to identifying emerging 
organizations – to revisit the assumption used by organizational scholars that firm foundings 
are discrete events. In this concluding chapter, I summarize my findings, discuss limitations 
encountered, and outline future extensions to this research. 
In the introductory chapter, I outlined three empirical challenges encountered by 
researchers who study the processes of emergence in new firms.  First, researchers should 
identify founders and their emerging firms early in their start-up process to reduce the impact 
of survivor bias in their analyses. Second, researchers should collect in-depth information on 
both founders and their new businesses to understand how founders’ characteristics influence 
the development of their businesses. Third, researchers should track progress of these new 
ventures and their founders over time. I used the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics 
(PSED), a random sample of 830 nascent entrepreneurs in the United States, collected in four 
waves between 1998 and 2003 to examine these research questions. The PSED was designed 
to address these three empirical challenges.  
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 In Chapter 2 (“Too Close for Comfort”), I explored how founders form their support 
networks from which to solicit assistance, advice, and other forms of backing during the 
start-up process. I drew from social capital and social exchange theories to hypothesize that 
founders are more likely to work with their strong ties due to norms of reciprocity that guide 
these relationships. I also hypothesized that founders who work with weak and indirect ties 
can benefit from their negotiated exchanges. I found that founders work closely with one 
subset of their strong ties: family members. As the number of family ties among owners and 
supporters increases, founders were more likely to quit their new ventures. 
In Chapter 3 (“Rounding out the Team”), I examined how founders’ human capital 
guides their acquisition of external entrepreneurial knowledge. Based on human capital 
theory, I hypothesized that as founders’ human capital increases, they are less likely to solicit 
general knowledge, but more likely to solicit specific knowledge externally. I also relied on 
social capital theory to hypothesize that founders are more likely to solicit entrepreneurial 
knowledge from their professional colleagues. I found that founders relied on their specific 
human capital and looked to business associates and strangers to seek external knowledge. 
Founders who received external knowledge in the form of advice and business services were 
less likely to quit their start-up efforts. 
In Chapter 4 (“Open for Business”), I developed a multi-dimensional approach to 
identifying emerging organizations as an alternative approach to discrete events used by most 
organizational scholars. I developed properties of new organizations – goal orientation, 
boundedness, and inter-organizational exchange – from sociological definitions of 
established organizations. I linked organizing activities to these latent dimensions of 
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organizational emergence as observed indicators. Using this multi-dimensional model, I 
found that emergence processes differed across industrial sectors.  
Although the survey design used in the PSED addressed several empirical challenges 
faced by entrepreneurship researchers, I encountered four broad limitations in my dissertation 
work. These limitations were industry heterogeneity in the sample; lack of complete network 
information; assumption of a linear developmental trajectory; and sample attrition over time. 
I describe these four limitations and possible extensions for future research in further detail.  
First, because it relied on an individual-level sampling strategy, the PSED contains 
information across a wide range of industries. By utilizing this sampling design, the PSED 
avoided the difficulties of identifying nascent entrepreneurs within specific industries and 
allowed for analysis to generalize to the entire US population. However, some organizational 
scholars have argued that cross-industry samples complicate analyses due to the inability to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity associated with multiple industries (Carroll and Hannan 
2000). According to this perspective, researchers who conduct industry-specific studies can 
generate deeper insights by controlling for the diversity of organizational form. To assess 
whether results remain consistent, researchers would replicate their industry-specific studies 
across other industries to develop more generalized observations. In future research, 
industry-specific studies of nascent entrepreneurs may be used to expand findings generated 
from the randomized sampling design. These focused studies can also provide opportunities 
to explore specific emergence processes that are only relevant to particular organizational 
populations, such as fulfilling legal guidelines in highly regulated environments. Focused 
studies may also be more appropriate when examining start-up processes in firms that 
represent new organizational forms.  However, in order to conduct these focused studies, 
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appropriate methodologies are required to identify nascent entrepreneurs and their organizing 
efforts in early stages of emergence, especially if large samples are required for analyses.  
Second, although the PSED collected respondents’ team and support network 
characteristics, it did not capture additional network information on the respondents’ broader 
social and professional network. Although my analyses indicated that founders relied heavily 
on their existing direct ties, it is not clear to what extent these direct ties form the basis of 
their entire social network. In future research, having additional network information such as 
direct reports from alters, directional ties information, and relationship history information 
(i.e., did alter work with founder on a prior start-up) may reveal additional insights into how 
and on what basis founding teams and their support networks emerge.  
Recent network studies utilize empirical settings, such as large, multi-national or 
multi-divisional corporations that have well-defined boundaries and sufficient potential 
social ties among members to test various social network theories (e.g., Burt 2005; Hansen, 
Mors, and Løvås 2005). This type of bounded setting is suitable for exploring questions of 
entrepreneurial innovation and knowledge transfer. However, identifying bounded empirical 
settings to collect extended networks for nascent entrepreneurs may be more difficult. 
Several possible approaches can be considered. First, researchers can expand the ego-based 
data collection design used in the PSED. In addition to collecting information on up to five 
co-owners and five additional helpers, interviewing each of these alters directly will likely 
provide researchers with additional information on how founders develop collaborative 
partnerships during the start-up process. Second, following in the tradition of early network 
studies, researchers may identify a “community” of entrepreneurs, such as those affiliated 
with business incubators, local trade associations, industrial parks, or economic development 
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districts. Using their affiliations with these entities, researchers can explore to what extent 
founders’ extended ties overlap one another and the role these ties play in supporting their 
start-up efforts. Third, researchers can employ a hyper-sampling approach to identify 
founders and their extended networks in a particular region by initially sampling key network 
brokers, such as lawyers, bankers, and accountants (McPherson 2001). After identifying the 
entrepreneurs, researchers can follow up with a more detail network survey soliciting 
information on their collaborators. The objective of these alternate data collection strategies 
is to gather additional information on the composition and content of founders’ extended 
networks and track any changes to these networks over time.  
Third, the PSED survey design assumed a linear development trajectory for new 
ventures. From this perspective, once a particular organizing activity occurred, the PSED did 
not record any subsequent progress on this particular activity accomplished during the 
emergence process. For example, in terms of generating sales, the PSED did not collect 
information on whether ongoing revenues were generated after the initial sales occurred. In 
future research, repeated measures on organizing activities and other indicators of ongoing 
progress would be necessary to explore a more complex emergence model. With this 
additional information, researchers can test theories of organizational learning and 
developmental feedback. For example, do intra-organizational learning mechanisms observed 
in established organizations also apply to settings where organizational infrastructure 
continues to emerge? Or do founders have opportunities to experiment as their new ventures 
develop or are start-up pressures too significant to expend limited resources in this way? 
To capture this additional level of detail, researchers may opt to employ an inductive, 
qualitative approach to establish baseline processes and pretest possible questions for a 
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survey-based study. For example, when meeting with founders, researchers can request 
current financial statements, marketing programs, market research, and other materials that 
provide ‘real-time’ assessment of the new ventures’ development (e.g., Lichtenstein, Dooley, 
and Lumpkin Forthcoming). Researchers can also ask founders to journal their progress (e.g., 
in an online blog or written diary) and note any developmental challenges as they occur. To 
increase the efficiency of this approach, researchers may elect to select cases based on certain 
industries to take advantage of their relative start-up timeframe. For example, retail start-ups 
are more likely to progress rapidly and may require a strategy to capture progress more 
frequently compared to capital intensive manufacturing ventures.  
Fourth, due to sample attrition, PSED users must take steps in their longitudinal 
analyses to accommodate missing data. Although considerable effort was made by the survey 
research firm to minimize the number of lost respondents, the PSED achieved just below 75 
percent retention of the original respondents at the second interview and retained slightly 
more than 50 percent at the fourth and final interview. Without these data, researchers would 
need to employ multiple imputation techniques to analyze a complete sample.  
To improve sample retention in future panel studies, researchers can pursue two 
strategies: reduce the interval between interviews and modify the criteria that qualifies 
individuals as nascent entrepreneurs. The PSED contacted respondents at approximately 12 
month intervals. Given sufficient resources, more frequent interactions with founders would 
likely reduce sample attrition and improve founders’ recall of key information. For example, 
a replication of the PSED in Sweden contacted respondents every six months during a two 
year period and achieved over 90 percent response rate for each wave (Delmar and Shane 
Forthcoming). More frequent interviews can lead to 
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time sensitive information regarding their new ventures’ progress and individuals with whom 
they collaborated. 
A second approach to improving sample retention is to modify the criteria that qualify 
respondents for the survey. The PSED’s four-part criteria provided researchers with an initial 
approach to identify and qualify nascent entrepreneurs. In order to qualify, respondents 
reported being in the initial stages of starting a business, undertook some activity within the 
last twelve months, anticipated majority ownership, and did not generate positive cash flow 
for more than three months. The definition of “starting a business” was not pre-defined and 
supplied to the respondents. Thus, some respondents may have interpreted this statement 
more broadly than what researchers may have intended. For example, based on reviews of 
qualitative responses to a question on why respondents decided to pursue starting their 
businesses, a number reported that the business venture in question was also considered a 
hobby for the respondents. Because respondents may have sold a few projects to friends and 
neighbors, the hobby may be construed as a fledgling business venture and consequently, 
respondents would qualify for the survey. However, the respondents may simply intend to 
continue as a hobbyist. Additional analyses of the respondents who dropped out of the 
sample, especially those who only completed the initial interview may yield common 
characteristics that can be used to improve the definition and the qualifying criteria of 
nascent entrepreneurs in future research. 
Some questions still remain unresolved. First, given the liability of newness 
associated with working primarily with close ties, can founders establish more optimally 
configured support networks? What are the antecedent processes that allow founders to form 
these ideal-type networks? Can founders avoid this liability by acting “strategically” in their 
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network development? Second, by using the multi-dimensional approach to identifying 
emergent organizations, how would results from previous research on age-dependency of 
organizations change? Hannan & Freeman (1992: 197-200) acknowledged that exploring 
issues related to founding processes contribute to the “micro-foundations” of organizational 
ecology theory. Because of data limitations, they admitted to difficulties in developing these 
micro-foundations and thus favored macro theory testing with population-level data. By 
using the multi-dimensional approach to identifying new firms, new interpretations of 
survival trajectories may emerge, especially during their earliest periods of firms’ existence.  
Third, do founding processes remain consist across multiple forms of entrepreneurial 
action? As a representative sample of nascent entrepreneurs in the United States, the PSED 
captured information on founders whose motivation ranged from part-time supplemental 
work on their new ventures to joint work with a spouse as a potential ‘life-style’ business to 
full-time pursuit of a successful business opportunity. Thus, does founders’ initial motivation 
affect the processes they undergo to launch their ventures? Does it also explain why some 
founders persist in their pursuit of business opportunities? For example, five percent of 
founders reported that their first activity on their current ventures occurred 12 years or earlier 
prior to their interview.  Although most entrepreneurship research tends to focus on quick 
starters, examining entrepreneurial activity within a lifecourse framework may help explain 
how entrepreneurial entry may coincide with other life transitions (Aldrich and Kim 2007). 
Thus, individuals who ‘tinker’ with a business opportunity may also need to delay entry in 
order to accumulate sufficient financial resources or work experience. 
To conclude, founders encounter liabilities of newness as they transform their 
business concepts into viable, operating new businesses. Due to relationships in which they 
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are embedded, founders rely on their strong ties for support and expertise. As Stinchcombe 
(1965) predicted, founders face the risk of failure if they rely solely on the convenience of 
soliciting assistance through these relationships. Future research, especially in terms of 
focused, industry-specific studies, may yield additional insights into how Stinchcombe’s 
argument applies to emerging organizations and their founding processes. 
 
 
 110 
 
Table 1.1: Strengths and Limitations of Data Sources for Studying Entrepreneurs 
 
Data Type Data Sources Strengths to 
Studying 
Entrepreneurs 
Limitations to 
Studying 
Entrepreneurs 
Selected Citations 
Longitudinal 
Surveys 
National 
Longitudinal 
Surveys; Panel 
Study of Income 
Dynamics 
• Observations of  
transitions into 
self-employment 
over time  
• Ability to model 
delayed impact 
of key variables 
(e.g., financial)  
• Ability to study 
intergenerational 
effects 
• Restricted to 
certain 
populations 
(e.g. White, 
Young Men) 
• Samples size 
reduces over 
time due to 
attrition 
• Cohort effects 
 
• Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989) 
• Evans and Leighton 
(1989) 
• Fairlie (1999) 
Tax Records Internal Revenue 
Service Tax 
Returns 
• Assess specific 
variables related 
to legal 
formation of 
start-up and 
financial 
resources 
• Lack of key 
control 
variables, such 
as race and 
education 
• Holtz-Eakin et. al. 
(1994) 
Census Current 
Population 
Surveys 
• Ability to study 
impact of wage 
earnings on the 
decision to be 
self-employed 
• Quality of wage 
data raises 
complications 
in analysis 
 
• Devine (1994) 
• Fairlie and Meyer 
(1996) 
Social Surveys General Social 
Surveys 
• Rich 
demographic 
information over 
time 
• Not focused on 
entrepreneurs 
• Butler and Herring 
(1991) 
• Hout and Rosen (2000) 
Businesses Characteristics of 
Business Owners; 
Dun and 
Bradstreet 
• Large samples 
• Over-sampling 
of females and 
minority groups 
• Industry specific 
analytical 
capabilities 
• Selection bias 
towards 
examining 
existing 
businesses 
• Bates (1997) 
Survey of 
Entrepreneurs 
Panel Study of 
Entrepreneurial 
Dynamics (PSED) 
• Targeted at 
entrepreneurs 
• Specific 
measures of 
background 
characteristics 
• Comparison 
group not 
sampled from 
primary sample 
of nascent 
entrepreneurs 
• Gartner et. al. (2004b)  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Founding Team and Support Network Characteristics 
 
 
Variable Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Number of supporters (total) 2.09 4.36 0 50 1.00
2 Number of supporters (kin) 0.46 0.88 0 5 0.35 * 1.00
3 Number of supporters (non-kin) 0.97 1.31 0 5 0.18 * -0.05 1.00
4 Team size 1.69 0.90 1 5 -0.05 -0.07 * -0.13 * 1.00
5 All male team 0.43 0.49 0 1 0.00 -0.11 * 0.13 * -0.21 * 1.00
6 All female team 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.06 * 0.16 * 0.08 * -0.33 * -0.49 * 1.00
7 Mixed gender team 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.33 * -0.20 * -0.13 * 1.00
8 Teams with spousal pairs 0.28 0.45 0 1 -0.08 * -0.06 -0.20 * 0.38 * -0.53 * -0.35 * -0.14 * 1.00
9 Number of non spousal kin ties (team) 0.21 0.93 0 10 0.01 0.08 * -0.03 0.52 * -0.11 * -0.07 0.24 * 0.07 1.00
10 Team age heterogeneity 2.67 4.67 0 27.58 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 * 0.60 * -0.10 * -0.19 * 0.28 * 0.15 * 0.43 *
11 Ethnic diversity (team) 0.08 0.28 0 1 -0.07 -0.08 * -0.09 * 0.26 * -0.08 * -0.13 * 0.10 * 0.17 * -0.02
12 Primary/manufacturing start-up 0.15 0.36 0 1 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.10 * -0.15 * 0.01 0.03 0.03
13 Retail/wholesale start-up 0.25 0.43 0 1 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 * 0.08 * 0.01 0.01 -0.02
14 Consumer services start-up 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.02
15 Business services start-up 0.26 0.44 0 1 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.08 * -0.02
16 Proportion with start-up experience (team) 0.47 0.45 0 1 0.04 0.02 0.09 * -0.03 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.11 * -0.03
17 Average industry work experience (team) 8.09 8.19 0 50 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.09 * 0.00 -0.02 -0.08 * -0.03
18 Organizing time (months) 43.55 56.21 0.36 472.21 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.10 * 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.03
19 External sponsor 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.12 * 0.04 0.09 * -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
20 Average relationship length with supporters 11.61 10.57 0 54.50 0.03 0.58 * -0.41 * 0.02 -0.12 * 0.01 0.09 0.09 * 0.12 *
21 Total business discussions with supporters 26.00 35.45 0 320 0.19 * 0.36 * 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.08 0.05 -0.14 * -0.02
22 Teams with more than five supporters 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.70 * 0.23 * -0.16 * -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.01
a Variables 1 - 19 based on n=776; Variables 20 - 22 based on n=487
* p<0.05
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Founding Team and Support Network Characteristics (Continued) 
 
 
Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
9 Number of non spousal kin ties (team)
10 Team age heterogeneity 1.00
11 Ethnic diversity (team) 0.16 * 1.00
12 Primary/manufacturing start-up 0.06 -0.03 1.00
13 Retail/wholesale start-up 0.02 0.06 -0.24 * 1.00
14 Consumer services start-up -0.02 0.01 -0.30 * -0.41 * 1.00
15 Business services start-up -0.05 -0.04 -0.25 * -0.34 * -0.43 * 1.00
16 Proportion with start-up experience (team) 0.03 0.08 * 0.07 * -0.09 * -0.01 0.03 1.00
17 Average industry work experience (team) 0.07 0.00 0.26 * -0.12 * -0.05 -0.03 0.15 * 1.00
18 Organizing time (months) -0.09 * 0.02 0.08 * -0.04 0.05 -0.09 * 0.03 0.27 * 1.00
19 External sponsor 0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.09 * -0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.07 * -0.09 * 1.00
20 Average length of relationship with advisor 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.01 -0.11 * -0.03 0.13 * 0.18 * -0.11 * 1.00
21 Total business discussion with advisors -0.08 -0.05 0.09 * -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.13 * 0.02 -0.06 0.06 0.10 * 1.00
22 Teams with more than five advisors -0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.09 * 0.03 0.05 0.17 * 1.00
a Variables 1 - 19 based on n=776; Variables 20 - 22 based on n=487
* p<0.05
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Table 2.2: Negative Binomial Regression Models of Support Network Size 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Total Kin Non-Kin
Team size -0.11 -0.59** 0.01
[0.09] [0.17] [0.10]
Team age heterogeneity -0.03* 0.01 -0.01
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Number of non spousal kin ties 0.12* 0.36** 0.02
[0.07] [0.09] [0.07]
Teams with spousal pairs -0.23 0.29 -0.69**
[0.20] [0.23] [0.15]
Mixed gender team 0.53 0.72* -0.35
[0.33] [0.35] [0.31]
Mixed race team -0.47* -0.49 -0.35
[0.22] [0.33] [0.26]
Primary/mfg/trans start-up -0.29 -0.24 -0.26
[0.18] [0.24] [0.18]
Retail/wholesale start-up 0.03 0.18 -0.08
[0.16] [0.19] [0.14]
Consumer/support services start-up 0.24 0.15 -0.09
[0.18] [0.19] [0.13]
Proportion with start-up experience 0.18 0.14 0.20
[0.15] [0.15] [0.11]
Average industry work experience 0.01 0.00 0.00
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Organizing time (ln) 0.06 0.02 0.06
[0.06] [0.07] [0.05]
External sponsor 0.72** 0.23 0.34**
[0.24] [0.20] [0.13]
Constant 0.48* -0.25 -0.11
[0.22] [0.33] [0.23]
α 1.30** 1.32** 0.88**
0.17 0.23 0.13
-2LL -1452.74 -682.80 -1028.72
DF 13 13 13
χ2 51.60 28.95 52.06
a Robust standard errors in brackets; n=776
  one-tailed test for independent variables; two-tailed test for control variables
  * p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Negative Binomial Regression Models of Total Number of Business 
Discussion with Supporters 
 
Model 1 Model 2
Length of relationship with supporters (mean) 0.02** 0.00
[0.01] [0.01]
Number of supporters (total) 0.07*
[0.04]
Number of kin supporters 0.50**
[0.07]
Number of non kin supporters 0.14**
[0.05]
Team size 0.10 0.13*
[0.08] [0.08]
Number of non spousal kin ties on team -0.09 -0.14*
[0.08] [0.07]
Teams with spousal pairs -0.69** -0.49**
[0.15] [0.16]
Primary/Mfg/Trans Start-up 0.36 0.41
[0.23] [0.21]
Retail/Wholesale Start-up -0.01 -0.01
[0.17] [0.15]
Consumer/Support Services Start-up 0.06 0.12
[0.17] [0.15]
Proportion with start-up experience (team) 0.47** 0.39**
[0.13] [0.12]
Average team industry work experience (team) -0.01 -0.01
[0.01] [0.01]
Organizing time (ln) 0.00 0.02
[0.05] [0.05]
External sponsor 0.35* 0.37**
[0.15] [0.14]
Teams with more than 5 supporters -0.13 0.41*
[0.36] [0.17]
Constant 2.47** 2.09**
[0.25] [0.25]
α 1.33** 1.21**
0.09 0.09
-2LL -2024.95 -2002.32
DF 13 14
χ2 69.96 114.80
a Robust standard errors in brackets; n=487; 
  one-tailed test for independent variables; two-tailed test for control variables
  * p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Piecewise Exponential Models of Support Network Characteristics  
 
Model 1 Model 2
Venture age: -5.91** -5.93**
0 - 12 months [0.40] [0.39]
12 - 24 months -5.11** -5.13**
[0.35] [0.35]
24 - 48 months -4.87** -4.89**
[0.34] [0.34]
48 months + -5.27** -5.29**
[0.32] [0.31]
Number of supporters (total) -0.12** -0.15**
[0.04] [0.05]
Team size 0.12 0.15
[0.12] [0.12]
Team age heterogeneity 0.04* 0.05*
[0.02] [0.02]
Number of non spousal kin ties (team) 0.11
[0.08]
Number of total kin ties 0.05*
[0.03]
Teams with spousal pairs -0.67** -0.76**
[0.22] [0.23]
Number of business discussions 0.01* 0.00*
[0.00] [0.00]
Mixed gender team -0.88* -0.91*
[0.46] [0.46]
Mixed race team 0.35 0.34
[0.33] [0.33]
Primary/Mfg/Trans Start-up -0.16 -0.17
[0.30] [0.30]
Retail/Wholesale Start-up 0.16 0.14
[0.23] [0.23]
Consumer/Support Services Start-up -0.01 -0.02
[0.23] [0.23]
Proportion with start-up experience 0.13 0.13
[0.19] [0.19]
Average team industry work experience -0.04** -0.04**
[0.01] [0.01]
External sponsor 0.86** 0.85**
[0.21] [0.21]
Teams with more than 5 supporters 0.54 0.59
[0.52] [0.54]
-2LL (χ2) DF=19 -467.65 (3983.48) -466.9 (3987.89)
a Robust standard errors in brackets; one-tailed test for independent vars; two-tailed test for control vars
  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; Spells=2846
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Human Capital and Knowledge Contributions from Founding Team and Support Network 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Technical/Vocational 0.06 0.23 0 1 1.00
2 Some college 0.36 0.48 0 1 -0.19 1.00
3 College graduate 0.24 0.42 0 1 -0.14 -0.42 1.00
4 Post college 0.14 0.35 0 1 -0.10 -0.31 -0.23 1.00
5 General work experience 8.89 8.03 0 60 0.04 0.03 -0.07 -0.01 1.00
6 Managerial experience 8.05 8.19 0 53 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.22 -0.12 1.00
7 Industry work experience 8.18 9.03 0 53 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.12 0.17 0.35 1.00
8 Helped start other bus 0.43 0.50 0 1 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.27 0.14 1.00
9 Current business owner1 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.17 1.00
10 Current business owner2 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.18 1.00
11 Current business owner3 0.14 0.35 0 1 -0.04 -0.07 0.10 -0.07 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.12 -0.21 -0.14 1.00
12 Bus start-up course 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.00 0.07 -0.01 1.00
13 Primary/manufacturing 0.15 0.35 0 1 0.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.05 0.12 -0.03 0.04 -0.06 1.00
14 Retail/wholesale 0.25 0.44 0 1 -0.04 0.01 0.11 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.24 1.00
15 Consumer/support services 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.10 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.29 -0.41 1.00
16 Professional services 0.27 0.44 0 1 -0.07 0.05 0.03 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.25 -0.35 -0.43 1.00
17 New venture age (months) 43.34 55.83 0.36 472 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.27 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.10 -0.05 0.04 -0.08
18 External sponsor 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.02
19 Team size (net) 0.74 0.95 0 4 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.03
20 Support network size (total) 2.07 4.31 0 50 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.02
21 Teams >5 supporters 0.05 0.22 0 1 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.01
 
1Not working for anyone else; 2Working for others less than 35 hours/week; 3Working for others 35 hours/week or more * p<0.05 (in bold)
17 18 19 20 21
17 New venture age (months) 1.00
18 External sponsor -0.08 1.00
19 Team size (net) -0.09 -0.02 1.00
20 Support network size (total) 0.04 0.12 -0.06 1.00
21 Teams >5 supporters 0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.70 1.00
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Team Members Contributions & Relationships (n=379)
22 Information/advice 1.19 0.85 0 4 -0.07 0.02 0.06 0.14 -0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 -0.05 0.11
23 Business training 0.71 0.76 0 4 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.14
24 Business services 0.60 0.70 0 4 0.01 -0.04 0.13 0.07 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.11 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.08
25 Start-up experience 0.70 0.82 0 4 -0.04 -0.08 0.15 0.06 -0.08 0.18 0.11 0.26 -0.06 -0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.04 0.08
26 Industry experience 7.54 7.05 0 37 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.41 0.75 0.12 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.25 -0.12 -0.07 -0.02
27 Team member (spouse) 0.53 0.50 0 2 0.03 0.07 -0.10 -0.05 0.19 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.08
28 Team member (family) 0.25 0.63 0 4 -0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01
29 Team member (bus assoc) 0.25 0.61 0 4 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.18 -0.11 0.19 0.17 0.12 -0.06 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 0.11
30 Team member (friend) 0.34 0.72 0 4 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.09
31 Team member (stranger) 0.09 0.46 0 4 -0.05 -0.09 0.20 -0.01 -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.13 -0.04 0.04 -0.14 0.15
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Human Capital and Knowledge Contributions (Continued) 
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
22 Information/advice -0.01 -0.01 0.84 0.04 0.04 1.00
23 Business training 0.00 0.03 0.54 0.04 0.04 0.58 1.00
24 Business services -0.02 0.02 0.42 0.05 0.04 0.40 0.39 1.00
25 Start-up experience -0.03 0.06 0.59 0.05 0.06 0.48 0.44 0.36 1.00
26 Industry experience (avg) 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.18 1.00
27 Team member (spouse) 0.15 0.02 -0.26 -0.02 0.02 -0.27 -0.23 -0.11 -0.23 -0.10 1.00
28 Team member (family) -0.01 -0.03 0.41 0.06 0.04 0.33 0.24 0.20 0.20 -0.01 -0.21 1.00
29 Team member (bus assoc) -0.02 0.05 0.33 0.01 -0.06 0.31 0.26 0.10 0.26 0.20 -0.40 -0.15 1.00
30 Team member (friend) -0.11 0.01 0.48 0.05 0.04 0.43 0.17 0.25 0.23 -0.01 -0.36 -0.06 -0.09 1.00
31 Team member (stranger) -0.04 0.00 0.41 0.01 0.02 0.32 0.31 0.15 0.39 -0.01 -0.15 -0.07 0.10 -0.05 1.00
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Advisor Contributions & Relationships (n=478)
32 Information/advice 2.20 1.35 0 5 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 0.10 0.07 0.12 -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.01
33 Business training 1.09 1.16 0 5 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.13 0.03 0.17 -0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.08
34 Business services 0.53 0.81 0 5 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.06
35 Start-up experience 1.48 1.22 0 5 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.16 0.07 0.11 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.05
36 Supporter (spouse) 0.14 0.35 0 1 -0.03 -0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.09
37 supporter (family) 0.60 0.95 0 5 -0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.14 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.10 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.09
38 Supporter (bus assoc) 0.63 1.05 0 5 0.06 -0.05 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.01
39 Supporter (friend) 1.03 1.18 0 5 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.05 0.05
40 Supporter (teacher) 0.10 0.37 0 3 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.06
41 Supporter (stranger) 0.06 0.49 0 5 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.13 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.12
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
32 Information/advice 0.09 0.08 -0.14 0.47 0.47 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.08 0.13 0.17 1.00
33 Business training 0.06 0.22 -0.10 0.32 0.23 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.58
34 Business services 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.11 -0.11 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.33
35 Start-up experience 0.09 0.09 -0.17 0.47 0.39 -0.15 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.17 0.65
36 Supporter (spouse) -0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.04 0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.01 -0.27 0.07 -0.08 0.23 -0.05 0.10
37 Supporter (family) 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.24 0.22 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.14 0.18 -0.21 -0.15 -0.08 0.18
38 Supporter (bus assoc) 0.00 0.16 -0.01 0.26 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.16 0.33 -0.15 0.19 0.35
39 Supporter (friend) 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.20 0.24 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.09 -0.06 -0.14 0.43 -0.05 0.46
40 Supporter (teacher) 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.10 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.14 -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 0.13 0.15
41 Supporter (stranger) 0.01 0.00 0.10 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.10 -0.02 0.15 -0.01 -0.11 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.37 -0.06
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 41
33 Business training 1.00
34 Business services 0.35 1.00
35 Start-up experience 0.42 0.19 1.00
36 Supporter (spouse) 0.06 0.10 -0.01 1.00
37 Supporter (family) 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.03 1.00
38 Supporter (bus assoc) 0.32 0.19 0.40 -0.12 -0.22 1.00
39 Supporter (friend) 0.18 0.03 0.29 -0.08 -0.24 -0.21 1.00
40 Supporter (teacher) 0.15 -0.02 0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07
41 Supporter (stranger) -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 1.00
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Table 3.2: Negative Binomial Regression Models of Founding Team and  
Support Network Size 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2
Net team members Advisory Network Size
Technical/Vocational 0.33 -0.44
[0.20] [0.29]
Some college 0.30* -0.12
[0.13] [0.19]
College graduate 0.48** 0.21
[0.14] [0.23]
Post college 0.48** 0.17
[0.18] [0.20]
Work experience (Net mgr exp) -0.01 -0.01*
[0.01] [0.01]
Managerial experience 0.01 -0.01*
[0.01] [0.01]
Industry work experience -0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01]
Helped start other businesses -0.17* 0.13
[0.10] [0.13]
Current business owner -0.29* 0.06
 (Not working for anyone else) [0.13] [0.17]
Current business owner -0.28* 0.17
(Working for others less than 35 hours/week) [0.15] [0.17]
Current business owner -0.08 0.19
(Working for others 35 hours/week or more) [0.17] [0.17]
Completed business start-up course -0.33** 0.17
[0.10] [0.12]
Primary/mfg/trans start-up 0.18 -0.17
[0.15] [0.18]
Retail/wholesale start-up -0.22 0.03
[0.14] [0.14]
Consumer/support services start-up -0.07 0.38*
[0.13] [0.16]
External sponsor -0.04 0.64**
[0.14] [0.21]
New venture age (ln) -0.03 0.06
[0.04] [0.05]
Net team members -0.13*
[0.07]
Constant -0.12 0.32
[0.19] [0.25]
-2LL (DF) [χ2] -893.58 (17) [44.74] -1483.62 (18) [42.34]
a Robust standard errors in brackets; n=792 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01; one-tailed test for independent variables; two-tailed test for control variables
General 
Human 
Capital
Specific 
Human 
Capital
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Table 3.3: Logistic Regression Models of Knowledge Contributions by Founding Team and Support Network 
 
"a": Team Members 1a 1b† 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b
"b": Support Network
Technical/Vocational -0.41 -0.49 0.36 -0.3 0.73 0.27 -0.41 0.01
[0.50] [0.69] [0.44] [0.39] [0.51] [0.47] [0.50] [0.35]
Some college 0.33 0.06 0.13 -0.18 0.37 0.56* -0.56* 0.07
[0.38] [0.33] [0.30] [0.25] [0.30] [0.32] [0.34] [0.23]
College graduate 0.51 0.25 0.04 -0.46* 0.85** 0.62* -0.09 0.15
[0.42] [0.40] [0.34] [0.26] [0.32] [0.32] [0.37] [0.25]
Post college 0.50 0.09 -0.27 -0.48* 0.54 0.52 -0.95* -0.3
[0.57] [0.39] [0.39] [0.28] [0.37] [0.36] [0.46] [0.28]
Work experience (Net mgr exp) -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.01
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Managerial experience -0.03* 0.00 -0.01 0 -0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.02*
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Industry work experience 0.00 -0.03* 0 -0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.01 0
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Helped start other businesses -0.01 0.42 -0.07 0.18 0.19 0.69** 1.25** 0.27
[0.32] [0.28] [0.23] [0.17] [0.23] [0.18] [0.24] [0.17]
Current business owner 0.21 0.26 0.47* -0.22 0.38 -0.07 -0.3 -0.11
 (Not working for anyone else) [0.38] [0.34] [0.27] [0.22] [0.28] [0.24] [0.32] [0.22]
Current business owner 0.27 0.04 0.38 0.26 0.02 -0.04 -0.5 0.35
(Working for others less than 35 hours/week) [0.42] [0.33] [0.33] [0.25] [0.33] [0.25] [0.34] [0.24]
Current business owner 0.43 0.58 0.48 -0.02 0.51* -0.12 -0.03 0.12
(Working for others 35 hours/week or more) [0.41] [0.44] [0.32] [0.22] [0.29] [0.26] [0.32] [0.23]
Completed business start-up course 0.14 0.58* 0.43* 0.46** 0.09 0.2 -0.05 0.09
[0.26] [0.25] [0.22] [0.16] [0.21] [0.18] [0.22] [0.16]
Team member: Family 0.01 -0.85* 0.19 -0.75
[0.62] [0.42] [0.43] [0.56]
Team member: Business associate 1.18* -0.12 0.03 0.04
[0.64] [0.46] [0.45] [0.60]
Team member: Friend/acquaintance 0.44 -1.07* 0.18 -0.45
[0.59] [0.45] [0.44] [0.58]
General Knowledge Specialized Knowledge
Information & advice Business training Business services Start-up experience
General 
Human 
Capital
Specific 
Human 
Capital
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Table 3.3: Logistic Regression Models of Knowledge Contributions by Founding Team and Support Network (Continued) 
 
 
"a": Team Members 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b
"b": Support Network
Supporter: Family -0.25 0.5 1.52 -0.33
[0.28] [0.85] [1.19] [0.73]
Supporter: Business associate -0.30 0.95 1.35 0.64
[0.26] [0.85] [1.22] [0.74]
Supporter: Friend/acquaintance 0.66 0.96 0.17
[0.85] [1.16] [0.72]
Supporter: Teacher/counselor 0.89 1.88* 1.19 1.37
[0.79] [0.97] [1.23] [0.84]
Primary/mfg/trans start-up 0.61 0.56 -0.26 -0.1 0.01 0.01 0.38 -0.1
[0.48] [0.37] [0.34] [0.31] [0.31] [0.31] [0.34] [0.26]
Retail/wholesale start-up 0.35 0.17 -0.05 -0.36 0.14 -0.35 0.28 0
[0.33] [0.30] [0.26] [0.20] [0.28] [0.25] [0.31] [0.20]
Consumer/support services start-up 0.54 0.59* 0.02 -0.33 0.17 -0.04 0.44 -0.05
[0.34] [0.29] [0.26] [0.19] [0.27] [0.22] [0.27] [0.22]
External sponsor -0.21 0.53 0.19 0.92** 0.04 0.44 0.47 0.13
[0.31] [0.43] [0.30] [0.22] [0.35] [0.25] [0.31] [0.23]
New venture age (ln) 0.31* -0.01 0.13 0.08 -0.03 0.13 -0.19 0
[0.15] [0.11] [0.11] [0.07] [0.11] [0.09] [0.12] [0.07]
Net team members -0.07 -0.17 -0.06 0 -0.16 0.23** 0.17 -0.18*
[0.13] [0.14] [0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.11] [0.09]
Support network size -0.02 0.03* -0.09** 0.05*
[0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.02]
Teams with more than 5 supporters 0.36 -0.59 0.65 -0.34
[0.43] [0.31] [0.39] [0.33]
Constant 0.11 1.60** 0.28 -1.27 -0.99 -4.01** 0.11 -0.14
[0.76] [0.57] [0.61] [0.91] [0.61] [1.28] [0.73] [0.79]
Observations 541 1190 542 1188 542 1190 531 1115
-2LL -237.55 -396.06 -359.52 -763.9 -355.91 -574.6 -321.7 -685.07
DF [χ2] 21[19.89] 23[40.37] 21[28.36] 24[69.90] 21[22.51] 24[65.99] 21[65.24] 24[60.32]
a Robust standard errors in brackets; one-tailed test for independent variables; two-tailed test for control variables; †Reference category is Friends/Acquaintence
  * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01
Information & advice Business training Business services Start-up experience
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Table 3.4: Piecewise Exponential Models of Organizational Knowledge Characteristics 
 
Models 1 2 3 4
Venture age: -6.21** -6.27** -6.20** -5.49**
0 - 12 months [0.29] [0.29] [0.29] [0.34]
12 - 24 months -4.94** -4.99** -4.94** -4.21**
[0.19] [0.20] [0.20] [0.26]
24 - 48 months -4.78** -4.82** -4.77** -3.96**
[0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.25]
48 months + -5.30** -5.33** -5.28** -4.34**
[0.18] [0.17] [0.18] [0.27]
Team members provided information or advice -0.23* -0.24* -0.33**
[0.12] [0.13] [0.12]
Team members provided business training 0.12 0.12 0.17
[0.15] [0.15] [0.14]
Team members provided business services -0.50** -0.46** -0.43**
[0.14] [0.14] [0.14]
Team members have start-up experience 0.11 0.13 0.13
[0.11] [0.11] [0.12]
Supporters provided information or advice 0.03 0.04 0.04
[0.08] [0.08] [0.09]
Supporters provided business training 0.12 0.1 0.1
[0.08] [0.09] [0.09]
Supporters provided business services -0.24* -0.20* -0.14
[0.10] [0.11] [0.11]
Supporters have start-up experience -0.08 -0.09 -0.03
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
Technical/Vocational -0.57
[0.38]
Some college -0.02
[0.18]
College graduate -0.18
[0.21]
Post college -0.03
[0.23]
Work experience (Net mgr exp) 0
[0.01]
Managerial experience 0.01
[0.01]
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Table 3.4: Piecewise Exponential Models of Rate of Quitting on Organizational 
Knowledge Characteristics 
 
Models 1 2 3 4
Helped start other businesses -0.2
[0.14]
Current business owner -0.85**
 (Not working for anyone else) [0.18]
Current business owner -1.21**
(Working for others less than 35 hours/week) [0.26]
Current business owner -0.86**
(Working for others 35 hours/week or more) [0.22]
Completed business start-up course -0.34*
[0.13]
Average team industry work experience -0.03**
[0.01]
Primary/mfg/trans start-up -0.26 -0.25 -0.26 0
[0.21] [0.21] [0.21] [0.22]
Retail/wholesale start-up 0.16 0.14 0.15 -0.01
[0.16] [0.17] [0.16] [0.18]
Consumer/support services start-up -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.02
[0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17]
External sponsor 0.67** 0.64** 0.67** 0.75**
[0.15] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15]
Number of net new team members 0.42** 0.23** 0.42** 0.40**
[0.08] [0.06] [0.08] [0.09]
Support network size -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.06]
Teams with more than 5 supporters 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.16
[0.46] [0.41] [0.44] [0.54]
Observations 3703 3703 3703 3703
-2LL -721.66 -729.17 -718.73 -666.47
DF 15 15 19 31
χ2 6907.39 6726.17 6976.36 6817.17
a Robust standard errors in brackets; one-tailed test for independent variables; two-tailed test for control variables
  * p < 0.05
** p < 0.01
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Latent Variables and Observed Indicators 
 
(N=807) Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Goal Orientation  (η1)
1 y1
Developed 
product/service 0.82 0.38 1.00
2 y2
Started marketing of 
product/service 0.88 0.33 0.39 * 1.00
3 y3
Created financial 
projections 0.76 0.43 0.25 * 0.21 * 1.00
Boundedness (η2)
4 y4
Filed Federal income 
tax return 0.68 0.47 0.45 * 0.35 * 0.39 * 1.00
5 y5 Opened bank account 0.75 0.43 0.37 * 0.34 * 0.37 * 0.58 * 1.00
6 y6
Established supplier 
credit 0.70 0.46 0.32 * 0.24 * 0.36 * 0.38 * 0.42 * 1.00
Inter-organizational Exchange (η3) .
7 y7
Generated revenues 
from sale of 
goods/services 0.84 0.36 0.47 * 0.47 * 0.34 * 0.48 * 0.45 * 0.33 * 1.00
8 y8
Purchased, leased, 
rented equipment, 
facilities, property 0.84 0.37 0.32 * 0.36 * 0.31 * 0.40 * 0.44 * 0.34 * 0.42 * 1.00
9 y9
Purchased raw 
materials, inventory, 
supplies, components 0.92 0.27 0.31 * 0.39 * 0.22 * 0.30 * 0.30 * 0.25 * 0.41 * 0.39 * 1.00
Industrial Sector
10
Manufacturing/Trans/P
rimary 0.14 0.35 0.04 * -0.02 0.06 * 0.07 * 0.05 * 0.11 * 0.01 0.06 * 0.03 * 1.00
11 Retail/Wholesale 0.25 0.43 0.06 * 0.05 * -0.01 -0.01 0.03 * 0.11 * 0.04 * -0.01 0.05 * -0.24 * 1.00
12
Consumer/Support 
Services 0.34 0.47 -0.04 * -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 * -0.30 * -0.42 * 1.00
13 Professional Services 0.26 0.44 -0.05 * -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 * -0.16 * -0.03 * -0.04 * -0.02 -0.25 * -0.35 * -0.43 * 1.00
14
Organizing Time 
(Months) 43.30 55.47 0.02 0.00 -0.09 * 0.03 * -0.04 * 0.01 0.04 * 0.06 * 0.04 * 0.10 * -0.05 * 0.04 * -0.08 * 1.00
Min 0.36 .
          Max 472.21 * p<0.05
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Table 4.2: Organizational Emergence Model Fit Statistics 
 
Fit Statistics Model 1 Model 2
Correlation Residuals (Mean) -0.01
Primary/Manufacturing/Transportation -0.01
Retail/Wholesale -0.02
Consumer/Support Services -0.01
Professional Services -0.01
CFI 0.99 0.99
TLI 0.99 0.99
1-RMSEA 0.96 0.96
χ2 Value 54.16 87.51
Degrees of Freedom 23 64
P-Value 0.00 0.03
Model 1: Overall Model
Model 2: Multiple Group Analysis - 
Thresholds and Loadings Free Across Groups
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Table 4.3: Factor Loadings, Component Fit Statistics, and Predicted Probabilities – Overall Model 
β λ S.E. β*λ R2 θ τ η4= (-σ)
Pr(yj=1) 
when 
η4=0 η4= (σ)
∆ in 
Pr(yj=1)  %∆
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11=10-8) (12)
Goal Orientation 1.00 0.00
y1 Developed product/service 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.41 -0.88 0.55 0.91 1.00 0.45 80.9%
y2 Started marketing of product/service 1.03 0.07 1.03 0.59 0.41 -1.11 0.67 0.96 1.00 0.33 48.3%
y3 Created financial projections 0.87 0.07 0.87 0.45 0.55 -0.90 0.61 0.89 0.98 0.37 61.0%
Boundedness 1.07 0.065
y4 Filed Federal income tax return 1.00 0.00 1.07 0.83 0.17 -0.27 0.08 0.75 1.00 0.92 1131.4%
y5 Opened bank account 0.98 0.04 1.05 0.79 0.21 -0.65 0.35 0.92 1.00 0.65 188.6%
y6 Established supplier credit 0.79 0.056 0.84 0.51 0.49 -0.44 0.37 0.74 0.94 0.57 153.5%
Inter-organizational Exchange 1.13 0.065
y7 Generated revenues from sale of 
goods/services 1.00 0.00 1.13 0.82 0.19 -0.66 0.29 0.94 1.00 0.71 239.3%
y8 Purchased, leased, rented equipment, 
facilities, property 0.89 0.04 1.00 0.64 0.36 -0.65 0.40 0.86 0.99 0.59 146.4%
y9 Purchased raw materials, inventory, 
supplies, components 0.88 0.06 0.99 0.63 0.38 -0.94 0.60 0.94 1.00 0.40 67.3%
Organizing Time (Ln Months) γ Operating Status
          Goal Orientation -0.01 0.04 σ 0.79
Boundedness 0.04 0.04 σ2 0.63
Inter-organizational Exchange 0.14 0.05
Note: All β, λ coefficients significant at p<0.001. γ3 significant at p<0.05.
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Table 4.4: Change in Predicted Probabilities of Activity Occurrence by Industrial Sectors 
∆ in  Pr(yj=1)
Primary/Mfg/ 
Trans
Professional 
Services
Retail/ 
Wholesale
Consumer/ 
Support 
Services
Goal Orientation
y1 Developed product/service 0.45     0.69              0.41             0.00          0.79           
y2 Started marketing of product/service 0.33     0.10              0.50             0.00          0.72           
y3 Created financial projections 0.37     0.31              0.46             0.33          0.30           
Boundedness
y4 Filed Federal income tax return 0.92     0.97              0.96             0.65          0.95           
y5 Opened bank account 0.65     0.61              0.80             0.36          0.62           
y6 Established supplier credit 0.57     0.00              0.46             0.55          0.69           
Inter-organizational Exchange
y7 Generated revenues from sale of 
goods/services 0.71     1.00              0.81             0.20          0.78           
y8 Purchased, leased, rented equipment, 
facilities, property 0.59     0.34              0.75             0.40          0.65           
Total
 
 
Note: Calculations based on differences in predicted probabilities for one standard deviation above and below the mean value of organizational emergence 
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Figure 4.1: Organizational Emergence Model Path Diagram 
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Probabilities of Activity Occurrences by Industrial Sectors 
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*P&E refers to purchased, leased, or rented equipment, facilities, or 
property. 
Note: Organizational emergence ranges from -3σ to µ. 
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Appendix A: Coding Start-Up Activities 
 
 Respondents reported whether 28 start-up activities occurred and the month/year of 
the occurrence. Details on each activity appear in Gartner et al. (2004b). I constructed a 
variable, organizing time, based on the time between the first qualified start-up activity and 
the first interview. Several types of inconsistencies exist with these start-up activity reports. I 
created the following coding rules to address these inconsistencies. First, I designated 25 of 
the 28 activities as qualified activities for calculating organizing time. I defined organizing 
time as when a nascent entrepreneur conducts specific and tangible actions towards the 
creation of a new business. From the organizing time calculation, I excluded when 
respondents first started thinking about new venture idea and only referred to this date 
selectively (see below). Survey questions asking when a respondent started taking classes 
and began saving money to invest were poorly constructed and led to inconsistent reports. I 
omitted these two activities in organizing time calculations as well. 
Second, respondents in new ventures affiliated with an external sponsor, such as a 
multi-level marketing (MLM) firm or franchisor, may have attributed some start-up activities 
to their sponsors. To ascertain any questionable reports, I reviewed the start-up activity dates 
for these 51 cases and used their responses to open-ended questions as cross-validation. 
Nearly all respondents provided information on their sponsors. I compared the respondents’ 
reported dates with background information of the MLM available through their websites. In 
25 cases, the respondents provided information related to their external sponsors. Of these 
cases, 20 respondents reported the founding date of the MLM as the date when their 
ventures’ product/service was developed and in eight cases, when marketing activities 
commenced or listing in a phone book occurred. For these cases, I recoded these activity 
 130 
dates to when the respondents first reported thinking about starting the venture. In five cases, 
respondents used the MLM founding date to denote when a start-up team formed and 
patent/copyright/trademark application filed. I recoded the activities as not having occurred 
and their dates to missing. 
Third, after making these changes, I also reviewed the start-up activity dates for the 
top five percent of cases in terms of organizing time. I recoded dates in 13 cases because of 
apparent coding errors.  
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